The long-lasting effects of experiencing communism on financial risk-taking by Laudenbach, Christine et al.
The Long-lasting Effects of Experiencing
Communism on Financial Risk-Taking
Christine Laudenbach, Ulrike Malmendier, and Alexandra Niessen-Ruenzi∗
December 2018
Abstract
We analyze the long-term effects of living under communism and its anticapitalist
doctrine on financial risk-taking. Utilizing comprehensive German brokerage data, we
show that, decades after reunification, East Germans still invest significantly less in the
stock market than West Germans. Consistent with communist friends-and-foes propa-
ganda, East Germans are more likely to hold stocks of companies in communist countries
(China, Russia, Vietnam), and are particularly unlikely to invest in American compa-
nies or the financial industry. Effects are stronger for individuals for whom we expect
stronger emotional tagging, for example those living in communist “showcase cities” or
cities of Olympic gold medalists. In contrast, East Germans with negative experiences
of the communist system, e. g., those experiencing environmental pollution and suppres-
sion of religious beliefs and those without access to (Western) TV entertainment, invest
more in the stock market today. Election years appear to have trigger effects inducing
East Germans to reduce their stock-market investment further. We provide evidence of
negative welfare consequences, as indicated by investment in more expensive actively
managed funds, less diversified portfolios, and lower risk-adjusted returns.
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1 Introduction
Almost 30 years after Germany’s reunification, the persistent differences in beliefs, attitudes,
and decision-making between East and West Germans remain striking. From the role of
women in the workplace to xenophobia, from camping in a tent or a trailer to consumer
frugality, it is easy to draw statistical maps of Germany that clearly delineate the former
border. As the international media has been wondering about the Germans, after the Wall
has been down for longer than it was up, why do ”walls in their heads” remain?1
One such difference concerns the financial situation and wealth accumulation of East
and West Germans. East Germans are lagging behind in net wealth, far beyond what
lower income levels and higher unemployment rates can explain. Median net wealth is EUR
24,800 in the East, but ranges from EUR 55,700 to EUR 112,500 in similar-sized regions in
the West.2 Moreover, these differences in wealth accumulation are strongly correlated with
differences in financial decision making, in particular stock-market participation. Across all
counties in East Germany, mutual fund and stock ownership hover around 0 to 9%, while
going up to 60% in some counties in West Germany.
In this paper, we analyze to what extent the persistent differences in financial decision-
making are predicted by prior lifetime experiences. Personal lifetime experiences have been
found to be an important driver of financial risk taking. Risk perception and investment
in risky asset markets are particularly influenced by experienced market returns over the
lifetime (e.g., Malmendier and Nagel (2011)), experienced inflation (e.g., Malmendier and
Nagel (2016)), personal investment outcomes (e.g., Strahilevitz, Odean, and Barber (2011),
Kaustia and Knu¨pfer (2008)), and an investor’s local environment (e.g., Laudenbach, Loos,
and Pirschel (2017), Kaustia and Knu¨pfer (2012)). However, an important difference in this
setting is that, rather than having positive or negative prior experiences, East Germans
had virtually no experience with risky assets. Their financial decisions used to be limited
1 See, e. g., New York Time, 2/13/2018, “Germans Quietly Pass an Equinox of Unity, but the Walls
Remain”, or Washington Post, 10/3/2016, “Germany reunified 26 years ago, but some divisions are still
strong.”
2 Data from the 2018 survey of 45,000 Germans, conducted by the German online bank Comdirect, cf.
Sueddeutsche Zeitung, August 1, 2018, “Wo Deutschland wieder geteilt ist.”
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to choosing between the saving account, a type of mortgage-backed security, and a form
of (life) insurance savings account. Why, then, do East Germans appear to have such a
persistently negative attitude towards stock-market investment, on average?
In this study, we turn to the deeper underpinning of experience effects. A large literature
on affect and memory shows that emotions determine how strongly experiences are anchored
in memory. Building on an older literature on mood congruence and state dependence in the
1970s and 1980s (e.g., Weingartner, Miller, and Murphy (1977), Isen et al (1978), Blaney
(1986)), modern neurological foundations of mood and memory point to the role of the
amygdala in reconsolidating emotional memory traces (Dolan (2002), Richter-Levin and
Akirav (2003), LaBar and Cabeza (2006)). Specifically, the affective system determines
which components from the collection of processed information are preserved in memory
(Bergado, Lucas, and Richter-Levin (2011)). According to the concept of emotional tagging
(Richter-Levin and Akirav (2003)), emotionally arousing events may be better remembered
since emotionally dependent information can be modulated into enhanced memory. In the
context of autobiographical memory retrieval, Piefke et al (2003) show how different re-
sponses to an experience depend on positive versus negative valence in that different brain
areas get activated.
While these underpinnings are of interest in any “experience effect” context, they are
particularly relevant here, where East Germans did not have direct experiences, and we
will turn to the notion that communist government messaging may have influenced citi-
zens, and aim to understand the heterogeneity and persistence of such influence. That is,
rather than focusing exclusively on the exposure to macroeconomic realizations, we ask
how the ideological and emotional priming of lifetime experiences affects the intensity and
even direction of experience effects. We link experience with an anti-capitalist (communist)
regime to individuals’ long-term willingness to invest in capital markets and ask whether
there is variation by intensity and direction of exposure, depending on whether experiencing
communism has a positive or negative emotional tagging.
2
The object of our analysis are differences in financial risk-taking between East and West
Germans decades after Reunification. As emphasized in prior research (Alesina and Fuchs-
Schu¨ndeln (2007)), Germany is a unique testing ground since it was formerly divided into
two parts, a capitalist and a communist system, but reunified almost 30 years ago. People in
the Western part have lived in a capitalist system, with the German Exchange in Frankfurt
re-opened under American protectorate shortly after World war II, in 1945. People in East
Germany (the former GDR), instead, lived in a socialist system, were excluded from stock-
market participation, and were exposed to strongly negative views about capitalism in
general and stock markets in particular. The GDR’s focus on condemning capitalism was
caused by the fact that, in contrast to other communist regimes, it could not legitimate itself
by referring to a “national state” (Haury (2004)). Its territory was defined by the Allies
and Soviets, and there were Germans living on both sides of the border. Further, West
Germany publicly claimed to represent all Germans and called the GDR regime “puppets
of Moscow” (Haury (2004)). To stabilize its political system and to differentiate itself from
the West, GDR propaganda focused on the communist doctrine and its strongly negative
views about stock markets. For example, Lenin (1919) remarked with respect to the stock
market: “The necessity for a relentless war on the capitalists is becoming clearer and clearer
to the working class and that the stock exchange becomes the most prominent representative
of capitalist production itself.”. Survey results in this paper suggest that exposure to such
a doctrine matters even today: Significantly more East Germans than West Germans think
that investing in the stock market is simply immoral.
We first develop a theoretical framework to understand how different experiences in
East and West Germany may influence long lasting attitudes towards the stock market. We
model West Germans as learning about the stock market from their direct observations and
experiences. However, in East Germany, experience with the market is restricted, and there-
fore learning about the stock market can occur only through signals from the government.
Trusting citizens in East Germany believe the government signals to be true, while there is
a share of citizens distrusting the government and not updating their beliefs. Distrust may
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stem from many potential factors, for example attitudes towards communism or capitalism.
Our model predicts that attitudes towards the stock market continue to differ in East and
West Germany long after Reunification. We also use this framework to highlight potential
drivers of heterogeneity in the East-West difference in financial risk taking. These include
intensity of exposure to government signals prior to Reunification, attitudes towards or
distrust against the government, and the effect of a resurgence of pro-communist signals
during election years.
We test these predictions in a comprehensive data set of brokerage as well as data of
bank clients, augmented by several other data sources. Our core data is a large investor data
set from the brokerage entity of a large German branch bank, from 2004 to 2012. It provides
detailed holding, transaction, and demographic information for about 200,000 clients and is
thus significantly larger than most of the data sets used in the household finance literature.
The size matters particularly in our context where we aim to analyze East-West differences
and the long-run consequences of exposure to the communist system, as well as within-East
differences due to different emotional tagging. Only 20% of the German population live in
the East, and the East is split up in 70 “Landkreise” (county). Identification requires data
that contains enough investors within each county, e. g. in order to use regional proxies like
Stasi employees etc. Taken the parent company of the broker together with the bank data
set, our analysis uses data from financial institutions that command a 50% market share
in Germany, and importantly share does not remarkably differ between East and West
Germany.
We show that East German investors exhibit significantly lower willingness to take
stock-market risk, both on the extensive and the intensive margin. Even though they are
now subject to the same investment universe and identical legal and regulatory framework
as West German investors, East German clients are 19.4 pp less likely to participate in
the stock market, and conditional on participating, hold 7.2 pp less risky assets in their
portfolios. We replicate these findings on our bank data set, obtained from a large private
bank, that also includes individuals’ cash holdings and further wealth controls. Both in
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terms of statistical significance and in terms economic magnitude, the estimate effects are
remarkably similar across those data sets.
Analyzing portfolio holdings, we find that East Germans invest less in more capitalist
firms, namely financial institutions or firms located in the US, and more in firms located in
(formerly) communist countries, as well as formerly state-owned German companies. Results
hold if we include proxies for trust, familiarity, and financial literacy. They also hold if we
control for differences in risk attitudes and income on an individual and a regional basis,
and if we re-run the analysis for a subset of investors who moved from the former GDR to
West Germany after Reunification. Even though they now live under the same economic
circumstances as their West German counterparts, they are still less likely to invest in the
stock market. Similarly, we also find significant differences in participation for an (arguably
more homogenous) subset of investors living in East vs. West Berlin and for a subset of
individuals living in two comparable cities closely located on each side of the former border.
These findings should mitigate concerns that our main result is driven by differences in
wealth and economic development across German counties.
Fuchs-Schu¨ndeln and Masella (2016) show that the length of exposure to a communist
system matters for longer-term labor market outcomes for men. In line with these findings,
we show that the stock market participation gap between East and West Germans is larger
for individuals who were more exposed to the communist doctrine of the GDR. These are
investors older than 50 years, and those that live further away from the former border to
West-Germany.
The emphasis of our analysis lies not only on the exposure to communism itself but on
how an individual has experienced the communist system, i.e. whether positive or negative
emotions are associated with it. Specifically, we show that our results are stronger if the
proposed ideas of the regime were consistent with East Germans’ personal experiences
and thus associated with positive emotions. We argue that this should have been the case
for investors living in renamed cities, namely cities that obtained communist names when
belonging to the GDR. The act of renaming a city was celebrated publicly and intensively
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and we conjecture that individuals living in one of these cities were strongly exposed to anti-
capitalist ideology. For example, the district administration of the city of Chemnitz, which
was renamed to “Karl Marx Stadt”, was said to have a flagship role in promoting communist
ideology with an enormous number of voluntary state-security collaborators (spys) (Horsch,
1997). Aside transporting communist ideology directly, the GDR regime saw sports as a
means to demonstrate the superiority of socialism over the capitalist system. Particularly
the olympic games were used to evoke a feeling of “we” against “the enemy”, and olympic
winners were celebrated as national heroes. With this in mind, we use an alternative proxy
for positive emotional tagging of communist experience for individuals living in the same
city as an olympic (gold) medal winner. In line with our conjecture, we find that our baseline
effect is indeed stronger for individuals living in renamed cities or in the same city as an
olympic (gold) medal winner.
We also examine whether our main result is weaker for individuals whose experience
with the communist system may be tagged with negative emotions. Indoctrination as well as
propaganda may be less effective if it contradicts people’s cultural values or their everyday
experiences (McGuire, 1993). For example, Adena, Enikolopov, Petrova, Santarosa, and
Zhuravskaya (2015) find that exposure to Nazi radio increased support for the regime, but
only in places with historically high levels of anti-Semitism. In places with low levels of anti-
Semitism, exposure to Nazi radio actually resulted in lower levels of support for the Nazi
party. To test this conjecture in our context, we first exploit exogenous variation in access to
West German TV, caused by part of the population living in areas (for example, in valleys)
where TV signals from the West could not be received. The previous literature has shown
that resistance to the communist system was higher in regions of the GDR that did not
have access to West TV. According to Kern and Hainmueller (2009), West TV was a major
source of entertainment for East Germans, the lack of which resulted in lower satisfaction
with the GDR and hence a higher resistance to the political system.3 Since access to West
3Exposure to West German TV in the East has also been linked to consumption of advertised goods
(Bursztyn and Cantoni, 2016), aspirations (Hyll and Schneider, 2013), fertility rates (Bo¨nisch and Hyll, 2015),
entrepreneurship (Slavtchev and Wyrwich, 2017), beliefs about the determinants of success (Hennighausen,
2015), and crime (Friehe, Mu¨ller, and Neumeier, 2017). Interestingly, exposure to West TV appears unrelated
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TV is exogenous to other potentially confounding variables, we follow Bursztyn and Cantoni
(2016) and use it as a natural experiment to examine whether our main result is weaker for
investors living in these areas. We find this to be the case.
Another common feature of the communist systems is that religion is interpreted as a tool
used by the ruling classes to suppress people belonging to the working class. Thus, atheism
was propagated in communist countries like the GDR from early on in schools. Therefore,
we conjecture that religious people are likely to form negative views about the communist
system and should hold more positive views about Western countries in which freedom of
religion is much more respected. We show that differences between East and West German
investors are indeed mitigated in counties with high levels of religiosity. Furthermore, we
show that the stock market participation gap is less pronounced in areas that were highly
polluted during GDR times. Environmental pollution directly contradicts the claim of the
communist regime to protect the environment in the interest of peoples’ well-being.
We also test whether our results on stock market participation are stronger for regions
where communist ideology seems to be more in line with existing opinions and beliefs (Jowett
and O’Donnell (2012) and Adena, Enikolopov, Petrova, Santarosa, and Zhuravskaya (2015)).
As a first test, we make use of the variation in support for the secret surveillance system
(STASI). Even if reasons for serving as a collaborator were manifold, Mueller-Enbergs (1995)
name political and ideological reasons as the dominant motivation for serving as a unofficial
collaborator. We show that our baseline results are stronger for regions with a high number
of unofficial state-security collaborators. In addition, we use data from a survey conducted
in 2014 on how positive individuals view the former political GDR system and link the
answers to our investors on a regional level. Again, we find lower levels of stock market
participation in regions with a more positive attitude towards the former GDR. Finally,
we also establish the emotional dimension by making use of time-series differences in the
salience of ideological experiences and resulting views and beliefs. We conjecture that our
baseline effect should be stronger in election years, when public attention is focused on
to post-Reunification levels of consumption (Bursztyn and Cantoni, 2016) and to protest diffusion during
the 1989 East German revolution (Kern, 2011).
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political topics and pro-communist signals should be more salient. Our results support this
view.
Overall, our findings suggest that experiences that connote strong positive or negative
emotions are relevant for individuals’ behavior even almost 30 years after they have been
made. This is in line with evidence from cognitive psychology and neuroscience, suggesting
that experiences made under strong emotional influence are particularly salient to individ-
uals and a strong driver of behavior (Dolan (2002), Talarico, LaBar, and Rubin (2004), and
LaBar and Cabeza (2006)). We show a long-lasting effect of emotionally tagged experiences
with communism on financial risk taking even decades later. Individuals living in regions
with pro-communist views are particularly averse to participate in the stock market, and
pay a high price in terms of foregone wealth accumulation, lack of diversification, and excess
fees.
Our paper contributes to the growing literature on experience effects cited above. Much
of this research provides direct evidence of a beliefs channel, i. e., of a significant effect of
lifetime experiences on stock-market expectations. A closely related literature in political
economy and labor economics suggests that political and labor-market experiences have
long-lasting effects through different channels, such as the formation of preferences and
norms, or due to frictions in post-experience adjustment (Alesina and Fuchs-Schu¨ndeln
(2007), Lichter, Lo¨ﬄer, and Siegloch (2016)). Fuchs-Schuendeln and Schuendeln (2015), for
example, argue that the time a person has lived under a democratic system determines her
political preferences for democracy. Our analysis of the long-term effects of experiencing
communism and its emotional tagging combines the thrust of the finance literature and
the political economy literature on experience effects. It further sheds light on the deeper
underlying debate on how experiences are weighted and suggests that experiences associated
with strongly positive or negative emotions are most relevant for behavior.
In addition, we contribute to various strands of the literature on socioeconomic dif-
ferences between East and West Germans. Rainer and Siedler (2009) and Heineck and
Su¨ssmuth (2013) show that trust levels are lower in East Germany compared to West Ger-
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many. Lichter, Lo¨ﬄer, and Siegloch (2016) show that higher levels of STASI surveillance
led to lower levels of social capital as measured by interpersonal and institutional trust in
post-Reunification Germany. There also is evidence that individuals in East and West Ger-
many differ with regard to locus of control, neuroticism, conscientiousness, and openness:
Friehe, Pannenberg, and Wedow (2015) identify local surveillance intensity as a key driver
of the personality of former GDR citizens. Bucher-Koenen and Lamla (2014) show that
there is a significant financial literacy gap between East and West Germany. We contribute
to this mostly survey-based literature by investigating empirical data and hence the actual
investment decisions of individuals in East- and West Germany.
2 Theoretical Framework
We first present a theoretical framework to illustrate how past experiences of living in East
versus West Germany could lead to long-lasting differences in attitudes towards the stock
market, even decades after the reunification. In the model, citizens in West Germany learn
about the value of investing in the stock market from their observations of the market.
In East Germany, experience with the market is restricted, and therefore learning about
the stock market is influenced by signals from the government. After reunification, instead,
both (formerly) East and West Germans receive the same direct signals from the market.
While beliefs converge, the differences in experiences prior to reunification continue to drive
a wedge in beliefs between the East and West.
In the empirical analysis we will consider beliefs both in terms of expected returns and,
to a lesser extent, in terms of their moral judgment of the stock market as an institution.
Here, we focus on beliefs about future returns.
2.1 Setup
In our model, citizens are trying to learn about the value of investing in the stock market.
There are two possible states of the world, {G,B}, where G indicates that investing in the
stock market is good, and B that it is bad. Citizens start with a prior P (B) = 0.5 when
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born, and update beliefs applying Bayes’ rule to the signals they receive, albeit with the
twist that some may receive distorted signals and not fully account for the distortion. We
assume, given the equity premium, that the true state is G.
Citizens who are exposed to the stock market receive signals σt ∈ {g, b} about the true
state of the world in each period t, with p(σt = g|G) = p(σt = b|B) = θ, θ ∈ (0.5, 1]. While
West Germans have access to the stock market and receive the true signals, East Germans
do not, prior to reunification.4 Instead, East Germans receive government signals st ∈ {g, b}
about the value of investing in the stock market, which may be distorted. For simplicity,
we model the East German government as sending only b signals to their citizens.
We consider two types of updating behavior among East Germans in response to the
government signals. “Followers” take the government information at face value and believe
that the government is passing on the true signal, i. e., p(st = g|G) = p(st = b|B) = θ.
Others do not believe the information provided by the government. They believe instead
(in this case, correctly) that the signals sent by the government have no information.
Whether or not an East German subscribes to the views of the communist government
could depend on many factors. More pro-communist people will be more inclined to believe a
message from the East German government than more pro-capitalist people. In the empirical
analysis, we will show that the inclination to subscribe to the government’s messaging
about capitalism and the stock market is related to their past lifetime experiences under
the communist system. The more positive their personal circumstances have been, the more
likely they are to endorse the government views and incorporate its signals into their beliefs.
We will denote this effect as emotional coloring (or, emotional tagging). In the theoretical
analysis, we simply assume that a fraction q of East Germans question the government
messaging about the stock market and do not incorporate it into their beliefs (non-followers),
and a fraction 1− q does (followers).
After Reunification, both formerly-East and West Germans have exposure and access
to the market, and receive the true signals σt. In the baseline set-up, citizens update only
4In this simple model, we abstract from heterogeneity in experiences with the stock market, for example
by age, participation in the market, etc.
10
based on the true signals σt after Reunification. Later, in Subsection 2.5, we will explore
the implications of a resurgence of communist signals post-Reunification.
2.2 East vs. West Germany
Before Reunification, a citizen with prior belief Pt−1(B) responds to receiving (true) signal
σt at time t by updating to the posterior
Pt(B|σt, Pt−1(B)) = p(σt|B)Pt−1(B)
p(σt|B)Pt−1(B) + p(σt|G)(1− Pt−1(B)) .
For example, if σt = b, beliefs will be updated
Pt(B|b, Pt−1(B)) = θPt−1(B)
θPt−1(B) + (1− θ)(1− Pt−1(B)) > Pt−1(B)
as θ > 0.5. That is, a b signal increases beliefs that the stock market is bad, while a g signal
moves beliefs in the opposite direction.
East Germans who subscribe to the views of the government (followers) update their
beliefs in the same way in response to government messaging st. Non-followers, instead, do
not update their beliefs prior to reunification, Pt(B|st) = 0.5 ∀t, st.
Given the differences in experiences with the market, we can now characterize the aver-
age beliefs of East and West Germans at the time of reunification. Let’s assume that there
are n1 periods pre-reunification, in which the East receives only bad (government) signals,
while the West receives g1 good and b1 bad (true) signals, with n1 = g1 + b1 and g1 > b1.
Then, (average) beliefs of East Germans, P¯R,East, and beliefs of West Germans, PR,West, at
reunification are
P¯R,East(B) = qPR,East(B|non-follower) + (1− q)PR,East(B|follower)(1)
= q(0.5) + (1− q) θ
n1
θn1 + (1− θ)n1 ≥ 0.5,
PR,West(B) =
(1− θ)g1−b1
θg1−b1 + (1− θ)g1−b1 < 0.5.(2)
11
That is, average beliefs of East and West Germans will be different, with East Germans
more likely to believe that investing in the stock market is bad than West Germans.
Result 1 At reunification, there will be a wedge in beliefs about the value of investing in
the stock market, with West Germans viewing stock-market investment more favorably than
East Germans.
Note that equations (1) and (2) implicitly highlight three groups of citizens: East German
“followers” and East German “non-follower” in (1) and West Germans in (2). At the time
of reunification, West Germans have the most positive views of the stock market, while East
Germans “followers” have the most negative views of the stock market.
The framework further captures why East and West Germans might continued to have
differing beliefs post-reunification. As West Germans have updated the uninformative prior
with true signals and East Germans have not (or have updated using distorted government
messages), they are starting off from different beliefs at unification and will converge, but
not instantly. Let’s assume that there are n2 periods post-Reunification so far, in which all
Germans receive g2 good signals and b2 bad signals, with g2 > b2 and, for ease of exposition,
n1 + b2 > g2. Then (average) beliefs in East and West Germany time R+ n2 are
P¯R+n2,East(B) = qPR+n2,East(B|non-follower) + (1− q)PR+n2,East(B|follower)(3)
= q
(1− θ)g2−b2
θg2−b2 + (1− θ)g2−b2 + (1− q)
θn1+b2−g2
θn1+b2−g2 + (1− θ)n1+b2−g2
≤ P¯R,East(B)
PR+n2,West(B) =
(1− θ)(g1+g2)−(b1+b2)
θ(g1+g2)−(b1+b2) + (1− θ)(g1+g2)−(b1+b2)(4)
≤ PR,West(B)
The equations reveal that, while both formerly-East and West Germans move their beliefs
towards G post-reunification, the ordering of the three groups remains intact, with
PR,West(B) < PR+n2,East(B|non-follower) < PR+n2,East(B|follower).
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Thus, while all beliefs are converging towards the true state G, there will continue to be
a gap in beliefs between the East and West. We note that other determinants, in addition
to people holding on to prior experiences, are likely to contribute to the lasting differences
between East and West. For example, confirmation bias may result in a slower rate of
convergence (or even divergence) after Reunification. Or, East Germans with a negative
view of the stock market, who are shying away from stock investment, might not update
their beliefs about the benefits of investing at the same rate.
Result 2 After Reunification, there will continue to be a wedge in beliefs between East and
West Germans.
We establish this baseline result empirically in Section 4.
2.3 Intensity of Exposure
Our framework allows to generate comparative statics of citizens with more or less exposure
to signals prior to Reunification by varying the size of n1. Less exposure might be temporal—
younger generations have received to fewer signals over their lives so far—or, in the case of
East Germans, geographic—government messages might be less effective for idiosyncratic
reasons such as conflicting religious beliefs, or the more open exchange with West Germany
in certain areas near the border (“Kleiner Grenzverkehr”).
Consider scaling the number of signals prior to reunification by a factor of α > 1. Beliefs
of West Germans then move more towards G as they receive on net (α − 1)(g1 − b1) more
positive signals:
(1− θ)(αg1+g2)−(αb1+b2)
θ(αg1+g2)−(αb1+b2) + (1− θ)(αg1+g2)−(αb1+b2) < PR+n2,West(B).
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Beliefs of East Germans non-followers will be unchanged as they do not learn from signals
prior to reunification. And beliefs of East Germans followers will move more towards B as
they receive α− 1 additional b signals,
θ(αn1+b2)−g2
θ(αn1+b2)−g2 + (1− θ)(αn1+b2)−g2 > P¯R+n2,East(B|follower).
With more pre-unification signals, the relative weight placed on pre-unification learning is
larger, resulting in a larger gap in beliefs between East and West even after Reunification.
Result 3 The wedge in post-reunification beliefs between East and West is increasing in
exposure n1 to government signals pre-reunification.
In Section 5.1, we will use variation in age and distance from the border as proxies for
exposure to pre-unification signals. We will show that the East-West gap in behavior is
larger for populations who likely received more pre-unification signals.
2.4 Direction of Exposure (Emotional Coloring)
As we discussed, we can think of many several determining whether an East German citizen
subscribes or does not subscribe to the government’s views and messaging. Our main em-
phasis here is the role of prior lifetime experiences, and in particular emotional coloring. In
the empirical analysis, we aim to identify several quasi-endogenous factors that may have
made living under communism a particularly good experience (e.g., living in a renamed
“showcase” city, living in a city with an Olympic medal winners) or a particularly bad
experience (e.g., conflict with the locally dominant religious beliefs, no access to TV enter-
tainment, high air pollution), and also correlate with indicators of pro-communist sentiment
in other domains.
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We can utilize the model to relate the gap between East and West beliefs to the level
of positive versus negative emotional tagging, as proxied by our fraction of followers versus
non-followers:
∂
∂q
[P¯R+n2,East(B)− PR+n2,West(B)] = PR+n2,East(B|non-follower)− PR+n2,East(B|follower) < 0.
Result 4 The wedge in post-Reunification beliefs between East and West is decreasing in
the level of distrust of the East government by formerly East Germans (qEE).
In Sections 5.3, 5.4, and 5.5, we show that the post-Reunification gap in investment
behavior is larger for former East Germans who likely had tagged more positive emotions
to their experiences with communism or held beliefs more consistent with the communist
doctrine and smaller for those who likely had more negative emotions tagged to their expe-
riences.
2.5 Trigger Points
So far, we have assumed that after reunification all citizens receive true signals σt from their
observations of the stock market in all periods t. However, there may be times when there is a
resurgence of anti-capitalist, communist messages. Specifically, election years tend to provide
media platforms and draw attention to the political messaging of all parties, including the
successor of the former ruling party in the East, the Socialist Unity Party of Germany
(SED). So far we have implicitly assumed that (distorted) messaging about the stock market
disappears or is ignored post-reunification, as the true signal is available to everybody.
An alternative assumption is that former “followers” in East Germany incorporate such
messages when they resurge, in addition to the true signals. (Another alternative is that
both East and West Germans with emotionally colored anti-capitalism experiences might
be receptive.)
Let’s consider the case that former West Germans and former East German non-followers
ignore these messages, while former East German followers treat these signals as informative.
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We can then compare the gap in beliefs n2 periods after Reunification without any elections
(Equations (3) - (4)) to the gap in beliefs if the n2-th period is an election year, in which
an additional b messaging is sent by the communist parties. In the latter case, the beliefs
of former East German followers are
PR+n2,East(B|follower, sn2 = b) =
θ(n1+b2+1)−g2
θ(n1+b2+1)−g2 + (1− θ)(n1+b2+1)−g2 > PR+n2,East(B|follower).
The resulting difference in the gap in beliefs is
(PR+n2,East(B|sR+n2 , σR+n2)− PR+n2,West(B|σR+n2)− (PR+n2,East(B|σR+n2)− PR+n2,West(B|σR+n2))
= (1− q)
(
θ(n1+b2+1)−g2
θ(n1+b2+1)−g2 + (1− θ)(n1+b2+1)−g2 −
θ(n1+b2)−g2
θ(n1+b2)−g2 + (1− θ)(n1+b2)−g2
)
> 0.
Result 5 In post-Reunification election years, when an additional b signal is received by
former East Germans who trusted the communist government, the gap in beliefs between
East and West will be larger than if it was a non-election year.
Indeed, in Section 5.6, we find that the gap in behavior between formerly East and West
Germans is larger in election years.5
3 Data and summary statistics
3.1 Brokerage data
For our main analysis, we obtain monthly security holdings and demographic information
on a representative sample of 230,229 retail investor accounts from June 2004 to December
5 We also find evidence that West Germans who are likely to be sympathetic to the communist cause
appear to be receptive to anti-stock-market signals and tend to diverge from other West Germans. However,
as long as their fraction is relatively small the average change in beliefs among West Germans will outweigh
the change among East Germans.
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2012. Data are provided by a German brokerage associated with a large bank present in
almost all counties of Germany. Figure 1 displays the distribution of investors in our sample
across Germany. In line with population densities, there are more observations in highly
populated areas such as, for example, the Ruhr Valley, but the entire country of Germany
is fairly represented in our data set. Summary statistics of our brokerage data are displayed
in Panel A.1 of Table 1.
The brokerage bank provided us with account data as well as portfolio holdings. Account
data mainly comprise investor characteristics like age, gender, marital status and account
related data like the date the account was open or closed (if applicable). One major variable
for this study is the ZIP code of an investor, which informs us whether an investor lives in
the former GDR and lets us additionally precisely define an investor’s local environment,
e.g. the distance to the former West-German border. We exclude 1,179 investors living in
the city of Berlin, which originally had an Eastern and a Western part. We use these clients
for a robustness test later in our analyses. For our final sample, we use 192,606 clients, for
whom all personal as well as regional control variables are available. Data on ZIP codes
allow us to determine that 20.4% of clients in our sample live in East Germany (i.e., the
former GDR). There are 52.6% male investors in our sample, and the average investor is 60
years old. The majority of investors is married (58.2%) and their accounts are on average
open for six years. The data on portfolio holdings can be merged to the account data via
an anonymized client identifier provided by the bank. These account data contain security
identifier (ISIN), volume, current price, and value (in Euro) of every security an investor
holds at the beginning of each month. We aggregate these data on the yearly level and find
that the average portfolio value in our sample is EUR 25,965. Stock market participation,
defined as a dummy variable equal to one if an investor holds stocks and/or equity funds
in her portfolio, and zero otherwise, is on average 82%. This number is quite high, because
most brokerage accounts are opened with the purpose to trade stocks and/or to buy and
hold equity in retirement savings plans. Similarly, the fraction of stocks held on average in
investors’ portfolios if they participate in the stock market is 73%, while investors hold on
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average 14.7% bonds (out of these, roughly 65% are government and public bonds, while
35% are corporate bonds). Only 3.8% of brokerage clients hold passive investments such as
index funds or ETFs. A detailed description of all variables contained in the brokerage data
set is provided in Appendix A.
Panel B.1 of Table 1 reports differences between East and West German investors in our
brokerage sample. In spite of the high level of stock market participation in our brokerage
data set, East Germans participate significantly less in the stock market than West Germans
(61% vs. 87%). While the fraction of stocks conditional on stock market participation is
also significantly lower in East German investors’ portfolios (67% vs. 74%), East German
investors hold more bonds than West German investors (30% vs. 11%). We also observe that
East and West German investors differ in characteristics that are related to stock market
participation like overall wealth levels. Specifically, we find that West German investors hold
significantly larger portfolios, live in counties with higher GDP per capita and higher real
estate wealth, and receive higher income. These differences mandate to include proxies for
investors’ overall wealth as control variables in our regressions, because they may contribute
to the stock market participation gap between East and West German investors.
3.2 Bank data
Since our brokerage data only allows us to analyze stock market participation conditional
on having a brokerage account (i.e., a portfolio), we use an additional data set of 6,903
randomly drawn clients from a larger German bank. This data set allows us to include a
broader set of investors in our regressions, i.e., those that have not opened a brokerage
account and only hold cash on a regular savings account. The bank provided us with a data
deduction of these clients’ personal characteristics as of August 2017. Again, data on clients’
ZIP code allow us to determine that 18.0% of them live in East Germany (i.e., the former
GDR). In addition, we have access to the respective monthly average account balances from
January 2016 to August 2017. We use the annual average of these monthly account balance
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snapshots in our later analysis. Summary statistics on the bank data set are provided in
Panel A.2 of Table 1.
In our bank data, stock market participation is only 12.5% on average. Note that for
this sample, we define participation as the percentage of clients holding any single stocks,
since the data set does not allow us to define a precise equity measure including assets
other than single stocks. If clients participate in the stock market, they hold 46.8% stocks
in their portfolios.6 Compared to the brokerage data, clients in the bank data are younger
(47 versus 60 years), and hold larger portfolios on average (69,532 Euro vs. 25,965 Euro).
Results in Panel B.2 of Table 1 report differences between East and West German
investors in the bank data set. East German investors are again significantly less likely to
participate in the stock market (8.0% vs. 13.5%). They also hold a lower fraction of stocks
in their portfolios conditional on participating in the stock market (62.7% vs. 72.3%). In
line with the brokerage data, we observe that East German clients in the bank data have
significantly lower portfolio values. They also have significantly lower savings.
For a subset of 2,133 bank clients, we obtain additional data from a survey that was
conducted by the bank at the beginning of 2017 with the intention to assess clients’ attitudes
towards retirement savings. These data allow us to identify bank clients that have moved
from the former GDR to West Germany after Reunification. A detailed description of all
variables contained in the bank data set is provided in Appendix A.
3.3 Supplemental data
To control for other factors that have been shown to influence stock market participation,
but are not available in our brokerage or bank data sets, we make use of various additional
data sources. They are listed in detail in Appendix A. As these variables can not be linked to
individual investors directly and are mostly available on the county level, we use investors’
ZIP code information to merge these variables to investors in our sample. Thus, investors
6We do not observe bond holdings in the bank data set.
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living in the same ZIP code area will be linked to the same geographical factors such as, for
example, real estate wealth or GDP per capita.
We obtain data on local real estate wealth from the SAVE survey, which is a yearly
household panel in Germany.7 On average, the self-reported real estate wealth of households
per county amounts to roughly 152,667 Euro (Panel A.3 of Table 1). It is significantly larger
in West Germany compared to East Germany (Panel B.3 of Table 1). Data on regional GDP
per capita, the fraction of inhabitants with a High-School degree, and the number of local
firms are obtained from the German Federal Statistical Office. All of these variables are
significantly larger in West Germany compared to East Germany (Panel B.3 of Table 1). To
proxy for trust, we use a variable measuring trust in securities markets from the bank survey.
We find that trust in securities markets is significantly lower in East Germany compared to
West Germany (3.01 vs. 3.26).
Proxies for familiarity and financial literacy are obtained from responses to the survey
data provided by our sample bank.8 To compute county averages, we use not only survey
answers of those clients we have account data on, but answers of the overall sample of 2,133
survey respondents. We find that familiarity with the stock market is significantly higher
in West Germany, while there is no significant difference in financial literacy between East
and West German investors.
4 Stock market participation in East and West Germany
It is one characteristic feature of communist systems like the GDR to manipulate individuals
in a way that they form strongly negative affective attitudes towards issues that the system
criticises. With respect to the stock market, Lenin (1919) stated that “The necessity for a
relentless war on the capitalists is becoming clearer and clearer to the working class and
that the stock exchange becomes the most prominent representative of capitalist production
7The first wave of SAVE was conducted in 2001 by the Mannheim Research Institute (now Munich
Center) for the Economics of Aging (MEA). Detailed information about the scope, the design and results
are provided by Boersch-Supan, Coppola, Essig, Eymann, and Schunk (2014).
8For the bank data set, we can directly link survey responses to client accounts.
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itself.” (see Figure 2). Similarly, according to Karl Marx, “All surplus-value, in the particular
form of profit, interest, returns, is in its essence unpaid labor.” (Marx (1867)). In this
section, we test whether individuals exposed to anti-capitalist propaganda of the GDR
formed negative attitudes towards the stock market, and whether these attitudes still result
in lower stock market participation even today.
4.1 Baseline result
To examine differences in stock market participation between East and West German in-
vestors, we run the following logit regression
(5) P (yit = 1|xit, Easti, Y eart) = Φ(α+ βEasti + γ´xit + Y eart),
where the binary indicator yit equals 1 if investor i holds stocks and/or equity funds in
her portfolios in year t, and zero otherwise. xit is a vector of control variables.
9 Our main
independent variable, Easti, is a dummy variable equal to one if an investor lives in East
Germany, and zero otherwise.10 We control for investors’ gender, age, and marital status,
since all of these variables may influence stock market participation. We also control for
the value of an investor’s portfolio to account for differences in financial wealth. Further,
we include the number of banks present in a given county to rule out that supply side
effects drive our results. We also include the number of people living in a given county to
capture differences between urban and rural areas, and the number of months an account
is open as it may take some time before investors purchase the first set of stocks after they
have opened their accounts. Finally, we capture differences in local economic development,
education, and wealth by including real estate wealth, the fraction of inhabitants with a high
school degree, local GDP, and the number of local firms in our regression. These variables
9Results are very similar if stock market participation is defined as investors holding stocks (but not
equity funds) in their portfolios.
10Note, that this information is only available for one point in time (when the account is opened at the
bank). For a subset of investors, examined in a later analysis, we observe whether they have moved from
East to West Germany based on survey data.
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are measured at the county level. The regression includes year fixed effects, robust standard
errors are clustered by county. Marginal effects evaluated at the mean investor are presented
in column (1) of Table 2.
Results in column (1) show that the average East German investor is 19.4pp less likely to
participate in the stock market than a West-German investor. The difference is significant at
the 1% level and economically meaningful: Given that the average stock market participation
in our sample is 81.9%, living in East Germany is associated with a 24% lower probability
to be invested in the stock market. This corroborates results 1 and 2 from our model in
section 2, according to which West Germans view the stock market more favorably than
East Germans after Reunification and in subsequent years. With respect to our control
variables, we find that female investors and older investors are less likely to participate in
the stock market. We also find that investors with larger portfolio values are significantly
less likely to participate in the stock market, which may seem counterintuitive. This result
is driven by the fact that many investors in our sample opened an online brokerage account
for retirement saving purposes, and usually invest small amounts of money according to a
monthly savings plan in just one broadly diversified equity fund. If we drop small portfolio
values below 5,000 Euro, the coefficient turns significantly positive. However, we decided to
keep these observations in the sample since these investors also made an active decision to
participate in the stock market and invest money in equity funds to save for retirement.11
Furthermore, we find that the longer an account has been opened, the more likely the
investor starts participating in the stock market. Comparing the economic significance of
the variables included in this regression, being from East Germany is a stronger predictor
of stock market participation than most of the other control variables such as gender or
portfolio value.
To examine investments in risky assets conditional on participating in the stock market,
we estimate the following OLS regression:
11To mitigate concerns that our main result only holds for certain wealth levels, we split our sample in
quartiles according to investors’ portfolio value, and re-run our main regression for each quartile. Coefficients
on the East dummy (not reported) are always negative and statistically significant at the 1% level. Our results
also hold, if we include squared portfolio values.
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(6) yit = α+ βEasti + γ´xit + Y eart + εit,
where yit now refers to the fraction of stocks held in an investor’s portfolio conditional
on holding any stocks or equity funds in her portfolio. We include the same vector of control
variables, xit, and year fixed effects as in equation 5, and also add year fixed effects. Results
in column (2) of Table 2 show that, conditional on stock market participation, East German
investors hold significantly fewer stocks in their portfolios than West German investors,
which we calculate as the value of stock holdings in Euro divided by the overall portfolio
value in Euro. In economic terms, the fraction of stocks in East German investors’ portfolios
is about 7.2 percentage points lower than that of West German investors. This translates
into a 9.9% difference relative to the average fraction of stocks in investors’ portfolios if
they participate in the stock market. This result is statistically significant at the 1% level.
Finally, we compute the fraction of bonds held in an investor’s portfolio as the value of
bonds in Euro divided by the overall portfolio value and use it as the dependent variable in
equation 6. Results are reported in column (3) of Table 2. We find a positive and statistically
significant coefficient on the East German dummy variable, indicating that the fraction of
bonds in East German investors’ portfolios is about 16.0 percentage points higher than the
fraction of bonds in West German investors’ portfolios. Compared to the mean fraction of
bonds in investors’ portfolios, East Germans hold twice as many bonds in their portfolios
than West Germans. This may be due to the fact that bonds have features like a fixed
interest rate that are more similar to the assets that were available to investors in the
former GDR and thus less citicized for representing capitalism.12
In the next step, we restrict the sample to individuals living in Berlin, which was split
in two parts after World War II. While East Berlin belonged to the GDR, West Berlin
belonged to the Federal Republic of Germany. The two parts of the city were separated by
12In line with this conjecture, we find in unreported results that East Germans, conditional on investing
in bonds, hold a significantly lower fraction of corporate bonds (25%) compared to West Germans (30%),
and a higher fraction of government bonds (75% vs. 70%, respectively).
23
the Berlin Wall, and inhabitants had no regular access to the other part of the city. Thus,
the case of Berlin serves as a good testing laboratory for our main hypothesis, and at the
same time may mitigate concerns regarding differences in economic development and wealth
between counties influencing our results for the entire German population.
We define a new dummy variable, East Berlin, which is equal to one if an individual
lives in East Berlin, and zero, if she lives in West Berlin. We then run the same regressions
as in Table 2, however, we can not include all control variables such as the number of banks,
GDP per Capita, Real estate wealth and Highschool degree, since these variables are only
available at the county level. At the same time, we are less concerned about these variables
in the Berlin setting, since, for example, all inhabitants of the city should have regular
access to a bank located close by. Results are reported in Table 3.
We re-confirm the stock market participation gap between East and West Germans also
for the Berlin population. Specifically, individuals from East Berlin are 4.6pp less likely
to participate in the stock market. Relative to the average stock market participation for
the city of Berlin (90%), this difference amounts to 5.1%. Thus, the economic magnitude
of the effect is less pronounced than for the entire country. This, however, may not be
surprising given that particularly some parts of East Berlin (for example, Prenzlauer Berg
and Friedrichshain) are nowadays inhabited by many West Germans, too. We do not find
that people in East Berlin hold smaller fractions of stocks conditional on participating in
the stock market (column (2)), but the fraction of bonds in their portfolios is 2.3pp higher.
As an alternative to comparing East and West Berlin, we identify two “matched cities”
of comparable size, i.e. Eisenach and Bad Hersfeld, that are located in similar distance to
the former West German border. The city of Eisenach is located in East Germany with
a distance of 29.8 kilometers to former border between East and West Germany. It has
about 43,000 inhabitants, and 224 observations from this city are included in our database.
The city of Bad Hersfeld is located in West Germany with a distance of 30.8 kilometers
to the former border. It has about 30,000 inhabitants, and 350 observations from this city
are included in our database. The distance between both cities is 59.8 kilometers and a
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40 minutes drive according to google maps. Both cities are well-known tourist destinations
and are comparable in terms of their industry structure, which is dominated by several
medium-sized businesses (Eisenach has a focus on automotive, Bad Hersfeld on textile and
logistics).
In unreported results, we re-run our baseline regression from Table 3 for a restricted
sample of individuals living in either Eisenach or Bad Hersfeld. Even though this regression
is only based on 574 observations, we still observe significantly lower stock market partici-
pation in the East German compared to the West German city (coefficient: -0.0303, t-stat:
-2.37). We also find that individuals in Eisenach hold a smaller fraction of stocks in their
portfolios conditional on participating in the stock market (coefficient: -0.136, t-stat: -1.80)
and a larger fraction of bonds (coefficient: 0.167, t-stat: 3.68).
One concern regarding our broker data could be a difference in the selection into the
specific brokerage bank between East and West German clients. To carefully address this
concern, we make use of a data set provided by the international data and analytics group
YouGov. YouGov derives its data by its own panel of over 70,000 respondents in Germany. It
collects and connects data on brand usage, brand perception and brand satisfaction. Impor-
tant for our context, respondents are asked about their residence (state), their perception
of different (bank) brands (including the bank with our brokerage entity) as well as the
name of the bank with their main account. Thus, we can generally look at the bank brand
perception in East and West Germany and additionally look at answers for a group of East
and West German respondents, who are clients at our brokerage bank. Figure 3 depicts
the results. Generally, the current as well as the former general market share of this bank
among respondents in the panel is not significantly different for East and West German
respondents (p-value for current customers: 0.21; p-value for former customers: 0.92). East
and West German respondents do also not significantly differ in brand and advertisement
awareness of the bank: 89% in both areas generally know the bank, 25% in both areas
report to have seen advertisements in the last two weeks and a slightly higher fraction of
East Germans than West Germans (24% compared to 21%) report to have talked to friends
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and family about the bank. With regard to clients of the bank, the general evaluation of
the bank brand on a five point scale (I hate it, I do not like it, its ok, I like it, I love it)
does also not significantly differ (p-value=0.40).
A second concern regarding our brokerage data is that we only observe stock market
participation conditional on having an online brokerage account. The gap in stock market
participation may be different for the overall population including individuals who do not
invest at all and only hold cash. The latter, however, would not be observable in our bro-
kerage account data set. To address this concern, we perform a similar analysis for the bank
data set (see section 3.2). This data set also comprises investors who have not opened a
brokerage account and only hold cash on a regular savings account. We again run a logit
regression where the dependent variable is equal to one if an investor generally participates
in the stock market (independent of having opened a portfolio), and zero otherwise. Results
are reported in Table 4 and confirm the findings from our main data set.
Column (1) of Table 4 shows that the average East German investor is 3.7pp less likely
to participate in the stock market than a West-German investor. The difference is significant
at the 1% level and economically meaningful: Given an average stock market participation
in our bank data sample of 12.5%, living in East Germany is associated with a 30% lower
probability to be invested in the stock market. In column (2), we use a specification which is
directly comparable to our brokerage data. Conditional on having a portfolio, East German
clients in this data set are 18.1pp less likely to participate in the stock market, which
corresponds to a 25% lower participation rate relative to the baseline probability of 71%
in this sample. This magnitude is very similar to the one we observe in our brokerage data
set (i.e., 24%). Finally, results in column (3) show that the fraction of stocks conditional
on having a portfolio is 17.1pp lower for clients living in East Germany compared to clients
living in West Germany.
In Appendix B, we re-run the same regressions as in Table 4, but additionally include
squared and cubic terms of investors’ income, savings, and portfolio values. The latter can
only be included in columns (4) and (5), which conditions on investors having opened a
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portfolio. We still observe a significantly negative coefficient on the dummy reflecting East
German investors, which is of similar economic magnitude than our results in Table 4.
Taken together, in both data sets, we find pronounced differences in stock market par-
ticipation between East and West Germans almost 30 years after Reunification. Although
we include a large set of individual and county level control variables in these regressions,
one remaining concern may be that the stock market participation gap between East and
West Germans is driven by differences in wealth and economic development between East
and West Germany. Therefore, we use survey data on a subset of investors allowing us to
identify individuals who moved from East to West Germany after the fall of the Berlin Wall
in 1989. More precisely, we are able to differentiate West Germans, who have never been
exposed to the GDR system and West Germans who have lived in the GDR until 1989 and
moved to West Germany before 2017.
Columns (1) to (4) in Table 5 show that East Germans who moved to West Germany
after Reunification are still less likely to participate in the stock market. In column (1),
we find that movers from East Germany are 4.6pp less likely to invest in the stock market
compared to West Germans. In column (2), we exclude all East Germans and only compare
West Germans to former East German investors who have moved and now live in West
Germany. These movers are 7.2pp less likely to participate in the stock market. In Columns
(3) and (4), we refine our mover variable and identify investors who have lived in West
Germany for a minimum of ten or twenty years. We still find a stock market participation
gap of 7.1pp to 10.6pp and effects are again economically large, namely a reduction in the
relative participation rate between 28% and 35%.
The existence of a stock market participation gap between East and West Germans is
further supported by statistics published by the German stock institute (DAI) and by self-
reported participation data obtained from the German Socio-Economic Panel (GSOEP).
Panel A of Figure 4 shows that, according to the DAI data, the participation gap between
East and West Germany amounts to 6pp on average, while it is around 10pp according to
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the GSOEP survey data.13 In economic terms, the different raw data available to us suggest
the following stock market participation gap between East and West Germans: 33% (DAI),
40% (GSOEP), 32% (brokerage data), 29% (bank data). After including control variables
in a regression framework, our brokerage and bank data show that a gap of about 19% to
24% remains.
4.2 Differences in attitudes, wealth, and stock market expectations
To better understand why East Germans participate significantly less in the stock market
than West Germans, we run a representative survey among 1,598 Germans in July 2018
with the help of the German poll institute NorStat. First, we ask whether a survey respon-
dent participates in the stock market or not. 24.5% of West Germans, and 18.7% of East
Germans responded that they have invested or are currently invested in the stock market.
The difference between East and West Germans is statistically significant (p-value 0.054).
In economic terms, it corresponds to a participation gap of 24.2% which is in line with
our findings from other databases in the previous section. Second, survey respondents who
indicated that they do not participate in the stock market received more detailed questions
on why this is the case. Results are presented in Panel A of Figure 5.
Survey results show that more East Germans than West Germans think that investing
in the stock market is immoral. East Germans also indicate more often that stocks are too
risky, that they do not trust the stock market, and that they generally do not like stocks.
These differences are all statistically significant. We do not observe significant differences
between East and West Germans regarding familiarity with stocks.
In the following, we examine to what extent these differences in attitudes towards the
stock market contribute to the stock market participation gap between East and West
Germans.14 Results are presented in Table 6.
13The jump around the year 2000 in GSOEP is probably due to a change in the survey question. Before
2001, the questionnaire included one question on whether an individual held any security at all. Since 2001,
stocks, mutual funds, bonds, derivatives”, “fixed income securities” and “insurance certificates” are different
categories.
14As some of these variable are only available for a small subset of observations, we do not include them
in our baseline regressions.
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Our survey, as well as previous work (e.g., Heineck and Su¨ssmuth (2013), Fuchs-
Schuendeln and Haliassos (2015)), shows that East Germans are more risk averse than
West Germans, particularly with respect to stock investments. In column (1) of Table 6, we
re-run our main regression from column (1) in Table 2, but additionally include investors’
risk tolerance. When clients open their account, the brokerage firm assesses their risk at-
titude on a scale ranging from 1 (conservative) to 3 (speculative). We obtain these data
for a sub-sample of 48,123 investors. Univariate statistics in Panel B of Table 1 confirm
our survey results and show that West-German investors have a significantly higher risk
tolerance than East German investors (1.74 versus 1.49 on average). After controlling for
risk aversion in our baseline regression, we still observe a significant stock market partici-
pation gap between East and West German investors of 22.7pp. We also still find that East
German investors hold a lower fraction of stocks in their portfolios (Panel B), while they
hold a higher fraction of bonds (Panel C). With respect to risk tolerance itself, we find that
risk-loving investors are significantly more likely to participate in the stock market and hold
a larger (smaller) fraction of stocks (bonds) in their portfolios.
Next, we examine whether income differentials explain the stock market participation
gap between investors from East and West Germany. Similar to our measure of risk aversion,
the brokerage firm assesses investors’ net income at account openings on a scale ranging
from 1 (below 1,000 Euro per month) to 4 (above 3,000 Euro per month) when they open an
account. Univariate statistics in Panel B of Table 1 show that West Germans on average earn
significantly higher income than East Germans. As higher income may predict stock market
participation, in column (2) of Table 6, we add investors’ income bracket as additional
control variable. In line with our predictions, we find that investors with higher income are
significantly more likely to participate in the stock market, and hold a higher (lower) fraction
of stocks (bonds) in their portfolios. However, East German investors are still 26.4pp less
likely to participate in the stock market than West German investors even after controlling
for income differentials. They also hold 15.2pp fewer stocks in their portfolios, and 20.6pp
more bonds.
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Our survey results show that East Germans have lower trust in securities markets than
West Germans. Since the level of trust is positively associated with stock market partic-
ipation (Guiso, Sapienza, and Zingales (2006) and Lichter, Lo¨ﬄer, and Siegloch (2016)),
we include a survey based measure of trust obtained from the bank data as an additional
control variable in our baseline regression (column (3)). We find that trust is indeed pos-
itively related to stock market participation. However, the stock market participation gap
between East and West German investors remains significant and still amounts to 29.3pp.
Conditional on participating in the stock market, East Germans hold 9.3pp fewer stocks in
their portfolios (Panel B). At the same time, they hold 21.7pp more bonds.
People in East Germany were not exposed to financial markets for 40 years and thus,
after Reunification, they were not familiar with most of the financial products offered to
West German investors (Fuchs-Schuendeln and Haliassos (2015)). In line with this view, we
observe a higher familiarity score for West Germans compared to East Germans in Panel
B.3 of Table 1, however, our survey results in Figure 5 do not show a significant difference
in familiarity with stocks between East and West Germans. Closely related, differences in
financial literacy between East and West Germany may contribute to the stock market
participation gap. Therefore, in columns (4) and (5) of Table 6, we include survey-based
measures of familiarity (“The stock market is a closed book to me”) and the basic financial
literacy score of van Rooij, Lusardi, and Alessie (2011) as additional control variables. Fa-
miliarity and financial literacy are aggregated at the county level. While we do not find an
impact of familiarity on stock market participation (neither at the extensive nor intensive
margin), non-familiarity with the stock market predicts a larger fraction of bonds in in-
vestors’ portfolios. Further, we find that financial literacy is significantly positively related
to stock-market participation at the extensive and intensive margin. Most importantly, we
still observe a stock market participation gap of 25.9pp to 27pp between East and West
German investors that is not explained by the addition of these variables. We also observe
that East German investors still hold about 9pp fewer stocks and about 20pp more bonds
in their portfolios.
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In column (6) of Table 6, we include all additional control variables at the same time.
Even though the resulting intersection of observations is rather small and drops to 64,553,
we still obtain a significant stock market participation gap between East and West German
investors at both, the extensive and intensive margin. We also observe that East German
investors hold a higher fraction of bonds in their portfolios.15
Even if we control for differences in wealth, the participation gap may also be driven by
how financially equipped people feel, e.g. whether East Germans think they need to save
less compared to West Germans. Data from the bank survey, however, do not show any
differences in responses between East and West Germans to the following statement “I am
afraid of poverty in old age.” The same question was also analyzed by a German opinion
poll institute YouGov. They find, if anything, a slightly higher agreement in East Germany
to the statement that they are afraid of poverty in old age (56% versus 51% in the West).16
It may also be the case that East and West Germans form different expectations re-
garding the stock market which may result in the stock market participation gap that we
observe. We include three questions in our survey to examine whether this is the case. First,
we ask “How do you think the stock market will develop over the next couple of months?”
We find no significant difference between East and West Germans’ expectations. About
26% think that the stock market will rise, 20% think it will stay as is, and 22% think that
it will fall. All others chose the “don’t know” option. Second, we ask whether respondents
think the stock market is currently over-, under- or correctly valued. Again, there is no
significant difference between East and West Germans. Finally we ask what average annual
return a respondent would expect if he had invested in the stock market for 30 years. East
Germans expect an average of 11.9%, while West Germans expect an average of 13.5%. The
difference is not statistically significant. The insignificance remains if we restrict our sample
to individuals who do not participate in the stock market. In addition, we use data of a
15Aside from risk tolerance, income, familiarity, trust, and financial literacy, differences in participation
may also be driven by differences in access to the stock market, for example through employee stocks. While
we don’t have information on whether investors in our sample hold employee stocks, data provided by the
German stock institute (DAI) suggest that the fraction of employee stock holders among all stock investors
does not differ largely between East (22%) and West Germany (20%) for the time between 1997 and 2016.
16Results are provided by Droesser (2016).
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stock market sentiment index constructed by the German market research institute Sentix.
This index is based on a weekly survey conducted among more than 4,000 respondents.
Regional identifiers are available since September 2016, which we use for our purposes. Re-
spondents are asked about their midterm (6 months) return expectations about the DAX
being bullish (-1), neutral (0), or bearish (1). We use 84,785 estimates for the time horizon
between September 2016 and August 2018 from 1,872 respondents, for whom we know the
place of residence. We then construct monthly averages for East and West Germans sepa-
rately. Figure 6 depicts our results. They suggest that stock market expectations of East
and West Germans are very similar. Results from a two-sided t-test do also not reveal sig-
nificant differences in stock market expectations between East and West Germans (p-value:
0.31).
We conclude that differences in stock market expectations, savings motives, familiarity
and financial literacy are unlikely to explain the stock market participation gap between East
and West Germans. Differences in risk aversion, trust, and income are significantly different
between East and West Germans and may thus contribute to the stock market participation
gap. However, even if we control for these differences, a significant participation gap between
East and West Germans remains. We argue that the remaining gap may be at least partly
explained by exposure to communist ideology, which results in long-lasting, negative views
on the stock market. In line with this view, Panel A of Figure 5 already shows that East
Germans are more likely to think that investing in the stock market is immoral. In Panel B of
Figure 5, we compute the fraction of East and West Germans thinking that investing in the
stock market is immoral conditional on whether they prefer the capitalist or the communist
system. Results show that particularly in East Germany, individuals with a preference for
communism think that investing in the stock market is immoral. Furthermore, 43.1% of
East Germans prefer the communist system, while only 32.8% of West Germans do so.
Thus, the communist ideology, which was strongly promoted via political propaganda in
East Germany, seems to have a long-lasting impact on how East Germans think about the
stock market.
32
5 Exposure to Communist Ideology
Our baseline results document that East German investors, who experienced the former
GDR system, express a lower willingness to take financial risk on both, the extensive and
the intensive margin. These results hold if we control for investors’ risk aversion, income,
financial literacy, trust, and familiarity even today when they are subject to the same
investment universe and identical legal and regulatory framework as West German investors.
The emphasis of this study lies, however, not only on the exposure to communism itself,
but on how the individual has experienced the communist system, i.e. whether positive or
negative emotions are associated with it. In this section, we therefore exploit variation in
intensity and direction of the exposure. First, we show that differences between East and
West Germans are larger for individuals who were more exposed to anti-capitalist GDR
propaganda in general, namely investors older than 50 years, and those that live further
away from the former border to West-Germany. Next, we show that our results are stronger
if the proposed ideas of the regime were consistent with East Germans’ personal experiences
and thus associated with positive emotions, namely for investors living in renamed cities
(e.g. Karl Marx Stadt) or regions with Olympic medal winners. Third, we will show that
our main result is weaker for individuals whose experience with the communist system may
be tagged with negative emotions, namely for religious investors, investors living in polluted
areas, or areas without Western TV reception. Lastly, we show that our results are stronger
for regions, where communist ideology seems to be more in line with existing opinions and
beliefs like regions with a high number of unofficial state-security collaborators or regions, in
which the a higher share of inhabitants expresses positive attitude towards the former GDR
today. Importantly for our analyses, we use proxies to exploit variation within the former
GDR instead of solely analyzing differences between East and West Germany. Appendix C
shows that our various measures of exposure to communist ideology indeed capture different
aspects of communist experience, since correlations between these measures are low. For
example, we find a correlation of -0.015 between living in a region with a high share of
Catholics and living in a renamed city. Most importantly, we are able to use differences
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in exposure that also break the link between the former GDR and the economic situation
today, which can be shown by the low correlation between living in an area with high GDP
per capita, and for example a renamed city (correlation coefficient of 0.03), or an area with
a high number of Olympic medal winners (correlation coefficient of -0.05), or a high number
of STASI collaborators (correlation coefficient of -0.12).
5.1 Intensity of exposure
If experiencing a communist system has indeed long-lasting effects on financial risk taking,
the effect should be stronger for individuals with more exposure to the communist doctrine
(see result 3 in Section 2). This means that our results should be stronger for older investors
who have lived in the GDR for a significant amount of time and thus should have had more
exposure to its communist ideology. In addition, we should see stronger effects for investors
living in counties further away from “West influences”, i.e., the former border to West
Germany. These investors also had more exposure to communist ideology and less exposure
to influences from West Germany, because they are less likely to have relatives just across
the border that could otherwise influence the way they were thinking about the different
political systems in East and West Germany. In our theoretical framework, we think of
these individuals as being exposed to more signals from the GDR prior to Reunification.
To test the influence of the intensity of exposure to communism on stock market partic-
ipation, we first sort investors in age deciles and plot stock market participation in Figure
7.
We indeed find that the stock market participation gap increases with age and is most
pronounced for the highest age deciles. Interestingly, we also observe a larger participation
gap for the first decile, which comprises the youngest individuals starting from 10 years of
age (the youngest individual in our sample). For these individuals, their parents are likely
to make the investment decision on behalf of their child, thus, parents’ experiences might
be driving the larger gap for the first decile. To make sure that income differentials between
different age cohorts of East and West Germans do not drive the graphical pattern we ob-
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serve, in Panel B, we first regress age on an individual’s income and then form deciles based
on the residual of this regressions. We still observe an increasing stock market participation
gap for older investors in East and West Germany.
We also examine cross-sectional differences in intensity of exposure to communist ide-
ology using our baseline regression model. In Column (1) of Table 7 we interact the East
German dummy variable with an indicator for investors older than 50 years. We find that
our baseline effect is indeed more pronounced for older investors, who are 19.2pp less likely
to participate in the stock market than their counterparts from West Germany.17 The dif-
ference in stock and bond holdings between East and West German investors (Panels B and
C) is also more pronounced for older investors and amounts to 9pp for stock holdings, and
18pp for bond holdings, respectively.
In 1972, the GDR and the FRG signed a travel agreement “Kleiner Grenzverkehr (border
circle of the GDR)”, according to which West Germans from nearby areas were allowed to
cross the border to the GDR for up to 30 days a year and 9 days a quarter, one day at a
time. The regions belonging to the travel agreement are displayed in Figure 8. Traveling to
the GDR was permitted to each resident of the FRG living in cities and districts listed as
“close to the border”. Only those areas of the GDR could be visited, which were listed as
belonging to the “border circle of the GDR”. The radius of this circle was approximately
100 kilometers. Travelers were allowed to visit relatives. In addition, travel due to purely
touristic reasons was also allowed. Living close to the former border to West Germany thus
increased the likelihood, that East Germans were exposed to West German influences due
to travelers (and relatives) visiting from the FRG. The GDR was well aware of this potential
threat to the stability of its political system. Its secret police, the STASI, closely monitored
activities among people living close to the border. Specifically, the STASI regularly prepared
reports on the “political and ideological situation at the border”. According to these reports,
negative opinions on the GDR system were expressed more frequently in areas close to
17In an alternative specification (not reported), we run our main regression separately for different age
brackets. Coefficients on the East dummy are always negative and statistically significant. However, as
suggested by Figure 7, the effect is economically larger for older investors and investors in the lowest age
decile.
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the border to West Germany. The GDR attributed these opinions to “hostile attempts of
manipulation by relatives and friends from West Germany, [...] leading to negative sentiment
in these areas [...] and eventually attempts to escape” (Ministry of State Security (1961),
Borderpolice (1960)). Therefore, we conjecture that our results are weaker for investors
living close to the border to West Germany, as they are more likely to have experienced
both, political propaganda of the GDR, as well as countervailing influences from West
Germany.
To test whether our main result is stronger for investors living further away from the
former border to West Germany, we interact the East German dummy variable with a
dummy variable which is equal to one for all investors living outside the border circle area,
i.e., more than 100 kilometers away from the former border to West Germany. The dummy
is equal to zero for all investors living within the border circle area, i.e., closer or equal to
100 kilometers from the former border to West Germany. Results are presented in column
(2) of Table 7 and show that our main results are indeed more pronounced for investors
living further away from the West German border. Specifically, East Germans living further
away from the West German border are less likely to participate in the stock market at
both, the extensive and intensive margin. Also, the fraction of bonds in their portfolios is
larger.
In column (3) of Table 7, we include all interactions as well as the baseline variable
differentiating between East and West German investors. We find that our main results
remain stronger for older investors and those living further away from the former border to
West Germany.
5.2 Direction of exposure
In order to legitimate and differentiate itself from Western Germany, the GDR regime aimed
at strengthening communist views and strongly criticized the economic system of capitalist
countries such as the US. At the same time, positive views were conveyed about other
communist countries such as Russia, China, or Vietnam. As an example, GDR authorities
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distributed posters that were supposed to demonstrate friendship with their communist
allies (see Panel A of Figure 2). At the same time, these posters were used to criticize the
US in general, and stock markets in particular (Panel B of Figure 2).
If the regime succeeded with this strategy and if the effect is long-lasting, we expect
that stock picking behavior of East German investors today is still biased by these views.
More precisely, we expect them to hold more stocks of firms from formerly communist
countries such as China, Russia and Vietnam. They should also prefer to buy stocks of
(formerly) state-owned German companies, such as Deutsche Post or Deutsche Telekom. At
the same time, East Germans should be less willing to hold stocks of firms reflecting Western
capitalism, i.e., stocks of financial companies and stocks of US companies. Appendix D lists
the top 10 holdings of (anti-) capitalist companies in our sample. Not surprisingly, the top
10 US stocks are well-known companies like Microsoft or Apple. The top 10 stocks belonging
to the financial industry are predominantly major German banks, financial advisory firms,
as well as insurance companies. With respect to Russian and Chinese firms, the top 10
holdings are predominantly stocks of state owned companies belonging to the Energy or
Basic Materials sector.18 Overall, stocks of communist countries are held by 4,812 investors
(3%) in our sample. Investments in stocks of firms in these countries are often conducted
via American or Global Depository Receipts (ADRs or GDRs). We regress the fraction of
stocks held in (anti-) capitalist companies on the East German dummy variable and the
same set of control variables as in Table 2. Results are reported in Table 8.
We find that, conditional on stock market participation, East German investors hold a
7.6pp lower share of financial companies and a 4.8pp lower share of US firms than investors
from West Germany. At the same time, they hold a 10.4pp higher share of stocks of compa-
nies located in Russia, China, or Vietnam, and a 4.1pp higher share of stocks of (formerly)
18There is only one Vietnamese stock held by investors in our sample. It belongs to an asset management
company that invests in previously state owned firms in Vietnam. This stock is held by 68 different customers
in our sample.
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state-owned German companies. All differences between East and West German investors
are statistically significant at the 1% level.19
5.3 Positive emotional tagging of communist experience
In the following, we examine the differential impact of communist experience on financial
risk taking conditional on its emotional coloring. Since emotions determine how strongly ex-
periences are anchored in memory (Dolan (2002), Richter-Levin and Akirav (2003), LaBar
and Cabeza (2006)), we need to understand the strength and direction of emotions a poten-
tial event triggered, as this will determine the weight an individual assigns to the experience.
We conjecture that two individuals with the same experience of a communist system may
respond with different behaviors, depending on whether their experience was tagged with a
positive or negative emotion. That is, exposure to communist doctrine may either result in
negative views on the stock market, if experiencing communism was associated with posi-
tive emotions. In our theoretical framework (see section 2), we think of positive emotions
towards the GDR as reflecting a lower level of distrust among East Germans for the GDR
(qEE ). Thus, individuals will behave in line with the communist doctrine. Or, in the case
of experiencing communism negatively, it may lead to a higher level of distrust in the sig-
nals obtained from the East German government, and therefore positive views on the stock
market.
We start by examining whether positive emotions towards the GDR amplify our baseline
effect. First, we define a dummy variable indicating whether an investor lives in a city
that was renamed after important communist personalities. Until today, almost 30 years
after Reunification, streets in many villages in East Germany have names reminding of the
communist system like “Rosa Luxemburg” street (a founding member of the communist
movement), “Ernst Tha¨lmann” Street (former head of the communist party), or “Street of
Friendship” (referring to the alliance between East Germany and Soviet Russia). When the
19To mitigate concerns that differences in risk-aversion rather than exposure to propaganda drive our
results, we re-estimate all regressions and include county-level risk aversion as an additional control variable.
Results (not reported) are robust.
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communists came into power in East Germany, several squares, streets, football stadiums
or iron works were renamed in order to immortalize communist heroes. One of the pushiest
acts was to rename German cities to express national pride. Renamed cities were selected by
a central committee of politicians. For example, the city of Chemnitz was renamed to “Karl
Marx Stadt” in order to celebrate the 135th anniversary of Karl Marx. Originally, it was
planned to give the name to the city of Eisenhu¨ttenstadt. However, after the death of Stalin
in 1953, Eisenhu¨ttenstadt was spontaneously renamed into “Stalin”-stadt and Chemnitz was
given the name “Karl Marx Stadt”. The act of renaming a city was celebrated publicly with
thousands of workers participating in marches and getting together on the big squares of the
city. Individuals living in one of the five renamed cities are likely to have their communist
experience tagged with positive emotions due to the expression of national pride and the
celebrations that came along with the act of renaming a city.20
Second, the GDR’s political leadership regarded athletic prowess as an important tool in
their efforts to prove their system’s superiority to western liberalism and promote national
pride. Erich Honecker, who was the GDR’s official head of state from 1976 onward stated
that “sport is not an end in itself, but the means to an end”21 The general strategy to
concentrate on specific disciplines proved successful since athletes form East Germany won
a total of 192 gold medals between 1968 and 1989 compared to 67 for West Germany. We
collect zip-code level data on the place of birth of all GDR winners of Olympic medals. We
conjecture that people living in a place that produced an Olympic medal winner also formed
particularly positive views and pride about the GDR. Data on Olympic medal winners are
collected from Wikipedia. We then define a dummy variable equal to one if there is an
Olympic (gold) medal winner in a given zip-code, and zero otherwise. We exclude the two
largest cities of Dresden and Leipzig, because we expect the pride effect to form in smaller
communities, where winning an Olympic medal was very special and made the respective
inhabitant outstanding of the community.
20The five renamed cities are Chemnitz, Eisenhu¨ttenstadt, Kriegsdorf, Neuhardenberg, and Werminghoff.
21Wilson Center: https://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/resource/sport-in-the-cold-war/episode-17-east-
german-soft-power.
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Results in Table 9 show that our main results are stronger for East Germans living in
(formerly) renamed cities. These investors are less likely to participate in the stock market
on both, the extensive and intensive margins, and they hold a larger fraction of bonds in their
portfolios. Similarly, East Germans living in the same zip-code area than an Olympic medal
winner hold a smaller fraction of stocks and a larger fraction of bonds in their portfolios.
We do not find a significant impact on stock market participation at the extensive margin.
However, the magnitude of the effect gets larger for gold medal winners, who may have been
more prominent and publicly acknowledged than Olympic medal winners in general.
5.4 Negative emotional tagging of communist experience
If positive emotional coloring of communist experience amplifies our main result, we should
also observe that our main result becomes weaker if communist experience is tagged with
negative emotions. We first examine negative emotional tagging of communist experience
through a natural experiment. It is based on differential access of East Germans to West
German television broadcasting during GDR times. According to Kern and Hainmueller
(2009), 40% of East German households had access to West TV through community anten-
nas. These are large antenna systems that are linked to individual households via cable.22
However, some regions in the former GDR were either too distant from the western border
or West Berlin, or located in valleys behind mountains that blocked TV broadcasting sig-
nals. A famous example is the district of Dresden, situated in the Elbe valley, which became
known as the “valley of the clueless” (Stiehler, 2001).
During the Cold War, the United States used radio projects such as “Voice of America”
or “Radio Liberty” to reach East German individuals and expose them to pro-Western
political opinions. TV consumption patterns in East and West Germany were, however,
very comparable and driven by an everyday desire for relaxation. As a result, on both
sides of the boarder, inhabitants preferred entertainment over news (Bo¨sch and Classen
(2015)). This is in line with findings in Chen and Yang (2018), who show that free access to
22Access to West TV was never illegal, but under close surveillance by the GDR government.
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uncensored Internet in China has little effect on students’ acquisition of politically sensitive
information from foreign news outlets. Rather, students preferred entertainment websites.
Therefore, in contrast to what one may expect, individuals in areas with access to Western
television programs were more satisfied with the political system of the GDR (Kern and
Hainmueller (2009)). In addition, Meyen (2003) argues that exposure to Western TV may
increase the awareness of the dark side of capitalism by making the potential downside of a
capitalistic society with high levels of crime, homelessness or unemployment more salient.23
Thus, not having access to Western TV should have resulted in negative emotional coloring
of experiencing a communist system and thus a lower willingness to follow the communist
doctrine.
Based on signal strength calculations from Bursztyn and Cantoni (2016), we define
a dummy variable reflecting counties in East Germany that did not receive signals from
Western TV stations during GDR times, and interact it with the East German dummy
variable. Results are reported in Panel A of Table 10.
We find that having no access to Western television in GDR times indeed reduces the
stock market participation gap between East and West German investors by 6.6pp (column
(1)). While there is no differential impact of access to West TV on the intensive margin
(column (2)), we also find that the difference in the fraction of bonds in East and West
German investors’ portfolios is only half the size for East German investors living in counties
without access to West TV.
In Panel B of Table 10, we examine the stock market participation gap for a more
homogenous subsample of investors, i.e., those living in counties without access to West TV
during GDR times, and those living in the same 3-digit zip code area but with access to
23One may have had the opposite hypothesis, i.e, that increased exposure to West TV would foster pro-
West or anti-GDR sentiment. This might especially be true if West German TV was broadcasting pro-West
propaganda to sympathetic viewers in the East. However, this does not seem to be consistent with the way in
which East Germans watched TV. Using a combination of historical data and retrospective interviews, Meyen
and Nawratil (2004) paint the following picture of East German attitudes towards West German television:
“Most of the viewers who were able to receive West German TV looked for entertainment on each channel,
and they switched back and forth for the respective offerings. If GDR TV placed journalistic broadcasts in
the prime time, the ratings were 5% or even below... That worked also the other way around: information
programs on the Western channels led to higher ratings of GDR TV.” Television channels reportedly also
recognized a higher demand for entertainment over news (Dittmar (2004) and Schubert and Stiehler (2004)).
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West TV. By examining differences between geographically close neighbors, we implicitly
control for other potentially cofounding factors. Our results are consistent with those from
Panel A. We find that East Germans living in counties without access to West TV are
17pp more likely to participate in the stock market than their neighbors in the same 3-
digit zip code area who had access to West TV (column (1)). Relative to the average stock
market participation for this subsample, this difference amounts to 25.5%. We again find no
differential impact on the intensive margin (column (2)), but individuals in counties with
no access to West TV hold 15.6% less bonds in their portfolios than those living close by
but with access to West TV (column (3)).
McGuire (1993) investigated factors that induced resistance towards ideological priming.
He argues that people are more likely to defend themselves against persuasion, if they hold
“cultural truism” that is, beliefs that are so ingrained within the cultural milieu that they
had never been attacked before. One common feature of communist systems is that they view
religion as a tool used by the ruling classes to suppress people belonging to the working
class. This view has already been articulated by Karl Marx who stated that “religion is
opium of the people” (Marx (1843)). While religious groups are rarely completely outlawed
in communist countries, religious property is frequently confiscated, believers are harassed,
and atheism is propagated in schools. Therefore, we conjecture that religious people are
likely to have their communist experience tagged negatively, and that they should hold
more positive views about Western countries in which freedom of religion is much more
respected.
To test whether our baseline results are weaker for individuals in East Germany whose
experiences with the GDR system went along with negative emotional coloring, i.e. religious
individuals, we define different variables capturing religiosity. First, we define a dummy
variable which is equal to one for all counties that maintained a high level of catholic
religiosity during GDR times and are still very catholic today, according to the Konrad
Adenauer Foundation.24 Second, we obtain data from the 2011 census on the fraction of
24These counties are Eichsfeld, thu¨ringische Rho¨n and sorbische Oberlausitz.
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catholics, protestants, or both, on the zip-code level. We then run the same regressions
as in Table 2, but interact the East German dummy variable with one of the proxies for
religiosity. Results are reported in Table 11.
Results in column (1) show that East Germans are 19.7pp less likely to participate in the
stock market. However, the effect is mitigated in counties with high catholic religiosity, with
a remaining difference of only 13.2pp. Results are similar if we use the fraction of Catholics
(column (2)), the fraction of protestants (column (3)), or the fraction of Catholics and
protestants (column (4)), to form the interaction term, respectively.
We also conjecture that people living in areas that were heavily polluted during GDR
times experienced communism with a more negative emotional coloring. According to the
GDR Constitution, it was in “the interest of peoples well-being, (that) the GDR takes care of
protecting the environment”. This statement directly contradicted reality for people living
in polluted areas. After the German Reunification in 1990, the ministry of environmental
affairs of West Germany defined 18 places in the GDR that needed immediate action to stop
environmental pollution because of out-aged power plants, filter plants, or chemical plants.
We define a dummy variable for all zip-codes belonging to these 18 places and interact it
with the East German dummy variable. Results in column (5) of Table 11 show that the
stock market participation gap between East and West Germany is again mitigated for
investors living in areas that were highly polluted during GDR times.25
5.5 Consistency of experience with attitudes towards communism
According to Jowett and O’Donnell (2012), effects of communist ideology on behavior should
be greatest when the ideological message is in line with existing opinions, beliefs, and
dispositions of the receivers. Thus, our main results should be stronger for East Germans
whose political views are in line with the communist ideology of the GDR. In our theoretical
framework, we think of these East German “GDR-supporters” as having a lower level of
distrust for the GDR (i.e., lower qEE ).
25We do not find a significant impact of religiosity and pollution on the fraction of stock and bond holdings,
respectively. For the sake of brevity, these results are not reported.
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To test whether our main result is stronger for “GDR-supporters”, we first exploit cross-
sectional variation in the number of state-security collaborators (spys) on the county level.
Reasons for serving as a collaborator were manifold, ranging from political and ideologi-
cal reasons, over personal (material) benefits to pressure. However, according to Mueller-
Enbergs (1995), political and ideological reasons have been the dominant motivation for
signing up as a voluntary collaborator at the secret police. Furthermore, the original moti-
vation to become a collaborator and the motivation to continue to work as a collaborator
changed over time. Mueller-Enbergs (1995) summarizes a survey conducted within the GDR,
where 60.5% of unofficial collaborators stated social requirements as a motivation to join,
but 78% as the underlying motivation to still work for the STASI. With regard to pres-
sure the number fell from 23.4% as a motivation to joiin to 12.6% as a motivation to stay.
Interesting for our puropse is also the increase in the the respondents answering an end
in itself as their underlying motivation from 12% (accession) to 25% (ongoing). Mueller-
Enbergs (1995) argues that the conspirative environment with its atmosphere of belonging
to a selected group of people had a positive emotional influence on the perception of the
governmental institutions in general. Based on these results, we argue that the amount of
voluntary STASI collaborator proxies for positive attitudes towards the political system
of the GDR. To test this conjecture, we interact the East German dummy variable with
the fraction of voluntary STASI collaborators, and perform the same set of regressions as
before.
Results are presented in Table 12. They show that East Germans living in regions with
a higher fraction of inofficial STASI collaborators are significantly less likely to participate
in the stock market at both, the extensive (column (1)) and intensive (column (3)) margin.
At the same time, they hold a higher fraction of bonds (column (5)).
As a second measure of positive attitudes towards the communist system of the GDR,
we examine regional variations in responses to a 2014 survey conducted by the German
polling institute “Infratest” asking 2000 individuals about the GDR’s political strengths
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compared to today’s political conditions in Germany.26 For each county, we compute the
fraction of survey respondents who agreed that the GDR had special strength with regard to
the political system. We then interact this measure with the East German dummy variable.
Results in columns (2) and (4) show that investors living in regions with positive views
on the former GDR system are less likely to participate in the stock market at both, the
extensive and intensive margin. Also, East Germans with more positive attitudes towards
the former political system of the GDR hold a larger fraction of bonds (column (6)).
5.6 Trigger points: Election years
Political attitudes should be particularly salient in election years when public attention is
devoted to who should govern and run the country. In these years, former East Germans
likely receive (or pay attention to) more signals from pro-communist politicians, family, and
friends. In our theoretical framework, we think of election years as a time when there is a
resurgence in anti-stock market signals, which increases the gap in beliefs between East and
West.
To test whether our baseline result on the stock market participation gap between East
and West Germans is stronger in election years, we interact the East German dummy
variable with an indicator reflecting election years in our sample (i.e., 2005 and 2009). We
then run the same regression as in Table 2, but additionally include this interaction term.
Result are reported in Table 13. They show that our baseline effect is indeed amplified in
election years, with the interaction term being statistically significant at the 1% level for
stock market participation and the fraction of bonds in investors’ portfolios, respectively. 27
26The exact questions was: “If you compare today’s social and political conditions to those in the former
GDR - Do you think the the GDR had special strength with regard to the political system?” Answering
possibilities were “yes”, “no” or “I do not know”.
27This result obtains if we look at the first election year, i.e. 2005, separately to mitigate concerns that
effects in 2009 may be cofounded by the financial crisis.
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6 Financial implications: Portfolio returns, fees, and diversi-
fication
Finally, we investigate whether East German investors’ exposure to communist ideology
and their corresponding reluctance to invest in the stock market is costly to them. A lower
life-time investment in the stock market should generally lead to lower financial wealth
in East Germany, because East German investors forgo the equity risk premium. Thus,
the differences regarding financial risk taking on the micro level we document may partly
explain why we still observe large wealth differences between East and West Germans on
the macro level, with East Germans’ total wealth being less than half that of West Germans
(Grabka (2014)).
In addition, East German investors may, due to their lack of experience with capital
markets or due to a smaller investment universe caused by the avoidance of certain coun-
tries or sectors, have lower stock picking skills than West German investors. To test this
conjecture, we compare monthly returns of East and West German investors’ portfolios. We
obtain monthly total return data including dividends from Thomson Reuters Datastream.
We then compute monthly portfolio returns on holdings derived from the monthly position
statements on a security-by-security level for each investor. For each month in our sam-
ple, we form equal or value weighted returns across all investors belonging to the East or
West German portfolio, respectively. We then compute the difference return of a portfolio
that is long in the East German portfolio and short in the West German portfolio less the
risk-free rate and regress it on the excess market return, the Fama and French (1993b) 3-
Factor model and the Carhart (1997a) 4-Factor model. In our regressions, we either include
German risk factors provided by the Center of Financial Research in Cologne (CFR), or
alternatively the global risk factors obtained from Kenneth French’s data library.28
28More details on the German risk factors can be found in Artmann, Finter, Kempf, Koch, and Theissen
(2012). The global risk factors can be obtained here: http://mba.tuck.dartmouth.edu/pages/faculty/
ken.french/index.html
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Results based on the German risk factors are presented in Panel A of Table 14. We
find that East German investors earn significantly lower returns than their West German
counterparts. Monthly performance alphas of the return difference portfolio range between
–0.07% and –0.11%. This translates into an annual return difference between 0.8% and 1.3%,
which is also economically meaningful. In Panel B, results are based on global risk factors.
We again observe that East Germans earn significantly lower returns than West Germans,
irrespective of whether portfolios are equal- or value weighted. Monthly performance alphas
are also very similar in economic terms and again vary between –0.07% and –0.11%.
In the next step, we examine whether other portfolio characteristics of East German
investors are also inferior to those of West German investors. First, we analyze whether an
investor holds passive investments, i.e., index funds and/or ETFs in her portfolio, as these
assets generally have lower fees compared to actively managed funds. Second, we examine
how many different assets East and West German investors hold in their portfolios. Third, we
calculate the average fund fees an investors pays for all equity funds in her portfolio in a given
year. To further capture the extent of portfolio diversification, we compute the Herfindahl
index of all stock holdings in a given portfolio. Finally, we compute the fraction of bank-
owned products included in an investor’s portfolio, which are typically associated with a
higher total expense ratio (Bucher-Koenen, Hackethal, Koenen, and Laudenbach, 2018).We
then run the same regressions as before and use one of these portfolio characteristics as the
dependent variable. Results are presented in Panel C of Table 14.
Results in column (1) show that East German investors are significantly less likely to
hold index funds or exchange trades funds. In economic terms, East German investors are
26.32% less likely to hold passive investments. We also find that, relative to the average
number of assets in our sample, East Germans hold 33.07% fewer assets in their portfolios
(column (2)). In addition, East German investors hold more expensive funds: Relative to the
mean fee in our sample (1.375%), they pay 3.71% higher fees on their equity funds (column
(3)). With respect to portfolio diversification, we find that the Herfindahl index for stock
holdings is significantly higher for East German investors’ portfolios, indicating that these
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portfolios are less diversified (column (4)). Finally, we find that investors in East Germany
are 7.45% more likely to hold bank-owned products than investors in West Germany.
7 Discussion
Our previous analysis shows that East Germans are significantly less likely to participate in
the stock market than West Germans. This result is unlikely to be driven by differences in
wealth levels between East and West Germany or differences in local economic conditions:
Our results survive a battery of tests including different proxies for wealth in linear and
non-linear specifications. They hold for people living in East and West Berlin, and they
are also observable between inhabitants of two structurally very similar cities close to the
former border between the FRG and the GDR. Furthermore, we still observe significant
differences in stock market participation between West Germans and people who moved
from East to West Germany 20 years ago, but nowadays live in West Germany.
We also show that East and West Germans have similar views on the brokerage firm
that provided us with the data set used in this paper. Access to branches of the firm is also
widespread in both, East and West Germany. The bank survey data described in section 3.2
contains a question on when respondents last took financial advice. 28% of West Germans
and 33% of East Germans respond that they never took financial advice. 16% (17%) of
West (East) Germans took advice more than five years ago, while 27% (25%) of West (East)
Germans took financial advice within the last five years. The remaining respondents took
advice within the last two years, including the year of the survey, i.e., 2017. We conclude
that differences in the propensity to take financial advice are also unlikely to explain our
results.
Our results are also unlikely to be driven by differences in trust levels, familiarity, finan-
cial literacy, or risk aversion. Our proxies for these constructs have a significant impact on
stock market participation in the expected directions, but do not affect the participation
gap between East and West Germans.
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Rather, we posit that exposure to communist doctrine results in a long-term anti-
capitalistic attitude that makes individuals reluctant to invest in the stock market. In line
with this view, differences within East Germany show that a more intense exposure to com-
munism that is connoted with positive emotions increases the stock market participation
gap between East and West Germans. Instead, negative communist experiences of East
Germans decrease the stock market participation gap.
An alternative view may be that instead of emotional tagging, people who were well off
during the GDR regime in absolute terms have a stronger attachment to the communist
doctrine. Instead, people who benefitted in relative terms from Reunification may have a
weaker attachment to the communist doctrine. As a result, the latter may be more likely
to converge to beliefs held in West Germany, including a larger willingness to invest in the
stock market. To distinguish between our emotional tagging hypothesis and this “relative
standing hypothesis”, we examine data from a survey among 1,551 East Germans which was
conducted in 1992 by the Office for Empirical Research on Social Economics in Cologne,
Germany.29 This survey asked respondents in East Germany on a three-point scale whether
their living standard had (1) improved, (2) stayed the same, or (3) deteriorated after Reuni-
fication. Furthermore, the survey asked whether individuals were planning to invest in the
stock market in the future (1=yes, 0=no). The correlation between these variables is -0.0377
with a p-value of 0.14. These findings do not support the view that relative standing, rather
than exposure to a communist doctrine and how it is anchored in memory drive our main
results.
An interesting question that arises from our findings is how individuals in other tran-
sition economies responded to the introduction of a stock market. Does experience with a
communist system always negatively affect people’s willingness to participate in the stock
market? It seems like it matters a lot, how the transition from a planned economy to a
market economy evolves.
29We thank the Office for Empirical Research on Social Economics for providing us access to their data.
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The fundamental difference between the communist system of the GDR and other for-
merly communist countries such as China is that the GDR regime was abruptly overthrown.
That is, the GDR party’s communist doctrine never fundamentally changed. After Reuni-
fication, the capitalist system of the FRG including its stock market, legislation, and gov-
ernance system were immediately established in East Germany. For our empirical analysis,
this is essential, as it rules out that weaker investor protection or governance standards
drive lower stock market participation in East Germany.
In other communist countries, change happened more gradually and within the sys-
tem. For example, in China, the communist regime remained in place and transformed the
economy stepwise to “state capitalism”, thus, the Party’s doctrine changed over time. The
Party itself established a stock market in 1990. About 60% of the average Chinese com-
panys shares are nontradable shares held by the government itself (Pistor and Xu (2005)).
In addition, the Chinese government created incentives for firms to raise equity capital via
IPOs. Thereby, the Chinese government signaled that it does not condemn stock markets
or investing in shares of companies. Chinese people thus do not face a conflict between
political ideology and investing in stocks. As a result, they have more positive views on the
stock market, although participation is still very low and amounts to 8-9% (Lucarelli and
Palomba (2007), Liang and Guo (2015)). This may be due to shareholder rights protection
issues and weak corporate governance (Goetzmann and Koell (2005).
In contrast, the transition in Russia resembled more closely the case of the GDR. After
the fall of the iron curtain, Russia quickly abolished price controls and interest rate controls
in a short period of time. Many firms were privatized in the 1990s, and the proceeds con-
centrated on a small amount of oligarchs. As a result, Russians perceived “capitalism just
how the Soviets had warned, with a few people requisitioning all the ladders and the vast
majority left to be devoured by snakes”.30 Russia’s stock market was established in 1992,
but even in 2015, stock market participation of the general population reached only 0.8%
(of Russia (2015)).
30https://www.theguardian.com/inequality/2017/apr/25/unequal-russia-is-anger-stirring-in-the-global-
capital-of-inequality
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Comparing these transition economies, it appears that quick changes from a planned to a
market based economy lead to large adaption problems. Since the new system contradicts the
values and experiences that people acquired with the established one, they seem reluctant
to accept the new system and its rules. These problems last for several decades and have
adverse effects on people’s financial well-being.
8 Conclusion
We show that experiencing a communist system leads to a persistently lower willingness
of East Germans to take financial risk, even almost 30 years after Reunification. Results
are stronger (weaker) for individuals whose experiences with the communist system of the
GDR are associated with positive (negative) emotions. We propose that even experiences
made a long time ago still have an impact on individuals’ behavior today, if they are tagged
with positive or negative emotions and thus strongly anchored in memory. Even if these
memories may not be relevant from an objective point of view, emotional tagging motivates
individuals to put more subjective weight on these memories.
We also show that the impact of experiences with a communist system are costly: East
German investors earn lower returns, hold less diversified portfolios, more expensive equity
funds, and fewer passively managed assets. Our results provide a micro-level foundation for
macroeconomic growth differentials between East and West Germany.
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Figure 1: Distribution of investors across Germany
This figure shows the number of investors per zip-code area in our brokerage sample across
Germany. The sample period covers June 2004 to December 2012.
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Figure 2: The art of propaganda
This figure shows propaganda posters that were used by the communist regimes of the Soviet union
(Panel A) and the GDR (Panel B) to promote anti-capitalist and anti-American attitudes, as well
as pro-Russian and pro-Vietnamese attitudes.
Panel A: Communist propaganda pro allies
Source: Landesarchiv Baden Wrttemberg, Deutsche Historisches Museum, Stadtgeschichtliches Museum Leipzig
Panel B: Communist propaganda against the stock market
Source: V. Ivanov, Vigilance is our weapon, Moscow 1953. Artur Grimmer 1955 in Monika Gibas (2004)
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Figure 3: Selection into our Broker Bank
This figure shows survey results provided by the international data and analytics group YouGov.
Respondents state whether (a) they are a customer of the bank, to which our broker belongs to
(b) they are a former customer of this bank (c) they generally know this bank (d) they have seen
advertisements of this bank within the last two weeks e) they have talked to a friend or family
member about this bank f) they generally like this bank. Answers to (f) are given on a 1 (I hate it)
to 5 (I love it) scale. In this figure, answers are shown separately for respondents in East and West
Germany. None of the answers differ significantly between East and West Germans.
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Figure 4: Stock market participation in Germany - Evidence from other data
sources
Panel A of this figure shows average stock market participation in East and West Germany based on
data provided by the German stock institute (DAI). The y-axis indicates the fraction of individuals
owning either stocks and/or mutual funds. The sample period is from 2004 to 2012. Panel B of this
figure shows average stock and bond holdings in East and West Germany from 1991-2015 based on
data provided by the German Socio-Ecnomic Panel (GSOEP). The y-axis indicates the proportion
of respondents that participate in security investments (combining bonds and stocks) in a given
year. Year on x-axis refers to the year of participation. There is a one-year lag in terms of survey
and actual participation. Until the year 2000 (that is, until participation year 1999), the SOEP
questionnaire only asked whether respondents held any securities (stocks, or bonds, or insurance
certificates). Since the 2001 survey (that is, since participation year 2000), “fixed income securities”
are listed separately and “other securities” include stocks, mutual funds, derivatives, and bonds.
Panel A: Stock market participation - German Stock Institute (DAI)
Panel B: Stock and bond holdings - German Socio-Economic Panel (GSOEP)
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Figure 5: Attitudes towards investing in the stock market
This figure shows results from a representative survey on attitudes towards the stock market among
non-participants conducted by the authors via the opinion poll institute Norstat in July 2018 among
1,598 Germans. The survey includes 1,283 West Germans, 246 East Germans, and 69 individuals
from Berlin. We first exclude inhabitants of Berlin from the original data as they may be East or
West German. The questions below were only shown to individuals who indicated before that they
do not participate (and have never participated) in the stock market.
Panel A: Attitudes of non-participants
Panel B: Communist ideology and views on the stock market
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Figure 6: Stock market return expectations
This figure shows average return expectations for the German stock index (DAX) over the next
six months based on responses of participants in a survey conducted by the market research firm
Sentix separately for respondents in East versus West Germany.
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Figure 7: Stock market participation by age
This figure shows the average percentage of East and West German investors’ stock holdings for
different age deciles in Panel A. In Panel B, we first regress age on an individual’s income, and then
form deciles based on the residuals of this regression.
Panel A: Participation in % by age deciles
Panel B: Participation in % by residual of age on income
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Figure 8: Distance to the border
This figure shows the areas of East and West Germany that belonged to the “Kleiner Grenzverkehr”,
i.e., the “border circle” region. Traveling to the GDR was permitted to each resident of the FRG
living in cities and districts listed as “close to the border”. Only those areas of the GDR could
be visited, which were listed as belonging to the “border circle of the GDR”. Source: Ministry of
Inner-German Relationships (Bundesministerium fr inner-deutsche Beziehungen).
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Table 1: Summary statistics
Panel A of this table shows the number of observations (Obs.), mean, standard deviation (sd),
median (p50), 1st percentile (p1), and 99th percentile (p99) of all variables in our sample. Brokerage
data are from 2004 to 2012. Bank data are from 2016 to 2017. Panel B shows differences between
East and West German investors. All variables are defined in detail in Appendix A.
Panel A: Summary statistics Obs. Mean sd p50 p1 p99
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
1. Brokerage account data (individual-level)
East 839,680 0.204 0.403 0.000 0.000 1.000
Gender (1=male) 839,680 0.526 0.499 1.000 0.000 1.000
Investor age (in years) 839,680 59.56 15.64 59.00 23.00 94.00
Married (1=yes) 839,680 0.582 0.493 1.000 0.000 1.000
Time account is open (in months) 839,680 74.223 32.576 74.000 7.000 137.00
Portfolio value (in Euro) 839,680 25,965 132,268 4,923.47 0.000 304,837
Stock market participation (1=yes) 839,680 0.819 0.385 1.000 0.000 1.000
Fraction of stocks if participating 687,464 0.725 0.391 1.000 0.000 1.000
Fraction of bonds 839,272 0.147 0.328 0.000 0.000 1.000
Passive investments (1=yes) 515,856 0.038 0.192 0.000 0.000 1.000
Number of assets in portfolio 839,680 4.442 6.921 2.000 1.000 31.000
Income (1=low, 4=high) 170,824 2.399 0.929 2.000 1.000 4.000
Risk tolerance (1=low, 3=high) 176,270 1.683 0.557 2.000 1.000 3.000
Fund fees (in %) 60,690 1.375 0.495 1.500 0.070 2.400
Portfolio concentration (Herfindahl) 622,777 0.689 0.331 0.815 0.070 1.000
Fraction of bank owned products 90,215 0.416 0.375 0.285 0.000 1.000
2. Bank data (individual level)
East 6,903 0.180 0.384 0.000 0.000 1.000
Portfolio value (in Euro) 1,445 50,014 174,830 3,074 0.000 1.000
Stock market participation (1=yes) 6,903 0.125 0.331 0.000 0.000 1.000
Fraction of stocks if participating 866 0.712 0.353 0.940 0.004 1.000
Portfolio (1=yes) 6,903 0.209 0.407 0.000 0.000 1.000
Gender (1=male) 6,903 0.556 0.497 0.000 0.000 1.000
Investor age (in years) 6,903 47.25 15.92 47.00 11.00 87.00
Married (1=yes) 6,903 0.420 0.494 0.000 0.000 1.000
Employed (1=yes) 6,903 0.411 0.492 0.000 0.000 1.000
Trainee (1=yes) 6,903 0.094 0.292 0.000 0.000 1.000
Retiree (1=yes) 6,903 0.061 0.239 0.000 0.000 1.000
Online banking (1=yes) 6,903 0.675 0.468 0.000 0.000 1.000
Mortgage (1=yes) 6,903 0.078 0.269 0.000 0.000 1.000
Relationship with bank (in years) 6.90 15.28 10.56 13.000 1.000 46.00
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Table 1: cont’d
Panel A: Summary statistics Obs. Mean sd p50 p1 p99
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
2. Bank data (individual level)
Credit score (Default Prob.) 6,903 0.006 0.021 0.001 0.000 0.070
Income (in Euro) 6,903 6,811 83,169 1,326 0.000 77,489
Savings (in Euro) 6,903 11,789 71,527 1,630 0.000 141,956
Risk att. (1= averse, 7=prone) 276 3.333 1.999 3.000 1.000 7.000
Fin. literacy (0=low, 3=high) 274 2.65 0.676 3.000 0.000 3.000
Real estate (1=yes) 276 0.496 0.501 0.000 0.000 1.000
3. County-level controls
Real estate wealth (in Euro) 839,680 152,667 153,658 132,773 0.000 767,913
Number of local banks 839,680 95.067 54.157 87.000 25.000 330.00
Tot. population (by Zip Code) 839,680 125,258 231,429 32,468 1,105 1,353,186
GDP per capita 839,680 26,927 11,031 23,919 14,649 69,566
Number of local firms 839,680 906.577 620.185 779.000 55.000 2,866
High school degree 839,680 0.160 0.060 0.146 0.076 0.363
Trust (1=low, 7=high) 684,441 3.221 0.710 3.143 1.500 5.500
Familiarity (1=high, 7=low) 699,126 3.583 1.161 3.438 1.000 7.000
Fin. literacy (0=low, 3=high) 698,373 2.679 0.327 2.750 1.000 3.000
Panel B: Differences East
German
West
German
Difference p-value
(1) (2) (3) (4)
1. Brokerage account data
Gender (1=male) 0.395 0.587 -0.191 0.000
Investor age (in years) 62.532 56.348 6.184 0.000
Married (1=yes) 0.601 0.577 0.024 0.000
Time account is open (in months) 69.124 75.531 -6.407 0.000
Income (1=low, 4=high) 2.109 2.516 -.407 0.000
Risk tolerance (1=low, 3=high) 1.494 1.744 -.249 0.000
Portfolio value (in Euro) 20,248.83 27,431.85 -7,183.02 0.000
Stock market participation (1=yes) 0.609 0.873 -0.264 0.000
Fraction of stocks if participating 0.671 0.735 -0.063 0.000
Fraction of bonds 0.304 0.107 0.197 0.000
Passive investments (1=yes) 0.018 0.043 -0.025 0.000
Number of assets in portfolio 3.185 4.764 -1.579 0.000
Fund fees (in %) 1.450 1.363 0.087 0.000
Portfolio concentration (Herfindahl) 0.738 0.681 0.057 0.000
Fraction of bank owned products 0.440 0.412 0.028 0.009
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Table 1: Summary statistics cont’d
Panel B: Differences East German West German Difference p-value
(1) (2) (3) (4)
2. Bank data
Portfolio value (in Euro) 32,217 52,488 -15,231 0.225
Stock market participation (1=yes) 0.080 0.135 -0.055 0.000
Fraction of stocks if participating 0.627 0.724 -0.096 0.010
Portfolio (1=yes) 0.186 0.214 -0.028 0.025
Gender (1=male) 0.512 0.564 -0.052 0.005
Investor age (in years) 47.28 47.25 0.030 0.961
Married (1=yes) 0.400 0.424 -0.024 0.115
Employed (1=yes) 0.411 0.411 0.000 0.999
Trainee (1=yes) 0.079 0.098 -0.019 0.038
Retiree (1=yes) 0.066 0.059 0.007 0.377
Online banking (1=yes) 0.659 0.678 -0.019 0.206
Mortgage (1=yes) 0.069 0.080 -0.011 0.19
Relationship with bank(years) 14.93 15.36 -0.430 0.201
Credit score (Default Probability) 0.006 0.006 0.000 0.976
Income (in Euro) 3,897 7,450 -3,553 0.173
Savings (in Euro) 8,225 12,571 -4,346 0.052
Risk att. (1= averse, 7=prone) 2,511 3,485 -974 0.000
Financial literacy (0=low, 3=high) 2.61 2.65 -0.032 0.780
Real estate (1=yes) 0.447 0.528 -0.081 0.313
3. County-level controls
Real estate wealth (in Euro) 92,850.15 168,012.30 -75,162.17 0.000
GDP per capita 19,698.93 28,933.56 -9,234.63 0.000
High school degree 0.137 0.165 -0.028 0.000
Number of local firms 949.47 893.18 56.29 0.480
Trust (1=low, 7=high) 3.005 3.260 –0.255 0.000
Familiarity (1=high, 7=low) 3.783 3.546 0.237 0.020
Fin. (0=low, 3=high) 2.609 2.692 -0.083 0.237
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Table 2: Differences in financial risk taking (brokerage data)
Column (1) of this table presents results from a logit regression with stock market partici-
pation as the dependent variable. Stock market participation is equal to one, if an investor
holds stocks and/or equity funds in her portfolio in a given year, and zero otherwise. Re-
sults in column (1) report marginal effects evaluated at the mean investor. z -stats based
on standard errors clustered by county are presented in parentheses. Results in columns
(2) and (3) are from pooled OLS regressions, where the dependent variable is the fraction
of stocks in an investor’s portfolio conditional on stock market participation (column (2)),
or the fraction of bonds in an investors’ portfolio (column (3)). t-stats based on standard
errors clustered by county are presented in parentheses in columns (2) and (3). The main
independent variable, East, is equal to one if an investor lives in East Germany, and zero
if an investor lives in West Germany. All variables are described in detail in Appendix A.
Regressions are based on the brokerage data set. The sample is from June 2004 to December
2012.
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Table 2: cont’d
Stock Fraction of stocks Fraction of bonds
market in in
participation portfolio portfolio
(1) (2) (3)
East –0.194∗∗∗ –0.072∗∗∗ 0.160∗∗∗
(–10.28) (–7.80) (9.77)
Gender (1=male) 0.070∗∗∗ 0.051∗∗∗ –0.081∗∗∗
(19.54) (16.08) (–22.14)
Investor age –0.104∗∗∗ 0.029∗∗∗ 0.141∗∗∗
(–17.43) (3.25) (15.71)
Married (1=yes) 0.040∗∗∗ 0.026∗∗∗ –0.041∗∗∗
(17.70) (8.14) (–12.79)
Ln(Portfolio value) –0.011∗∗∗ 0.042∗∗∗ 0.034∗∗∗
(–8.07) (33.83) (21.92)
Ln(Number of local banks) 0.007 –0.019∗∗ 0.020∗∗
(0.81) (–2.56) (2.43)
Ln(Total population) 0.007 0.005 –0.010∗∗∗
(1.64) (1.64) (–2.85)
Time account is open 0.116∗∗∗ –0.021∗∗∗ –0.096∗∗∗
(30.84) (–6.84) (–19.01)
Ln(Real estate wealth) –0.009∗∗∗ –0.002 0.003∗∗∗
(–6.51) (–1.47) (3.55)
High school degree 0.125 0.013 –0.232∗∗∗
(1.23) (0.22) (–2.61)
Ln(GDP per capita) 0.028∗ –0.014 0.023
(1.90) (–1.08) (1.62)
Ln(Number of local firms) 0.004 –0.006∗ –0.004
(0.83) (–1.74) (–0.79)
Year FE yes yes yes
Pseudo/Adj. R2 0.19 0.09 0.25
Observations 839,680 687,464 839,272
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Table 3: Differences between East and West Berlin
Column (1) of this table presents results from a logit regression with stock market partici-
pation as the dependent variable. Stock market participation is equal to one, if an investor
holds stocks and/or equity funds in her portfolio in a given year, and zero otherwise. Re-
sults in column (1) report marginal effects evaluated at the mean investor. z -stats based
on standard errors clustered by investor are presented in parentheses. Results in columns
(2) and (3) are from pooled OLS regressions, where the dependent variable is the fraction
of stocks in an investor’s portfolio conditional on stock market participation (column (2)),
or the fraction of bonds in an investors’ portfolio (column (3)). t-stats based on standard
errors clustered by investor are presented in parentheses in columns (2) and (3). The main
independent variable, East Berlin, is equal to one if an investor lives in a zip-code area
belonging to the former GDR, i.e., East Berlin, before Reunification, and zero if an investor
lives in West Berlin. All variables are described in detail in Appendix A. Regressions are
based on the brokerage data set. Observations are restricted to individuals living in Berlin.
The sample is from June 2004 to December 2012.
Stock Fraction of stocks Fraction of bonds
market in in
participation portfolio portfolio
(1) (2) (3)
East Berlin –0.046∗∗∗ 0.006 0.023∗∗∗
(–5.76) (0.45) (3.27)
Gender (1=male) 0.030∗∗∗ 0.012 –0.059∗∗∗
(3.67) (0.92) (–7.80)
Investor age –0.035∗ 0.044 0.047∗∗
(–1.89) (1.42) (2.11)
Married (1=yes) 0.025∗∗∗ 0.011 –0.013∗
(3.21) (0.80) (–1.88)
Ln(Portfolio value) –0.006∗∗∗ –0.036∗∗∗ 0.019∗∗∗
(–3.74) (–16.59) (15.59)
Time account is open 0.077∗∗∗ 0.012 –0.069∗∗∗
(13.03) (0.94) (–9.39)
Ln(Number of local firms) 0.003 –0.024∗ –0.008
(0.36) (–1.82) (–1.08)
Year FE yes yes yes
Pseudo/Adj. R2 0.14 0.13 0.14
Observations 16,207 14,595 16,204
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Table 4: Differences in financial risk taking (bank data)
Column (1) of this table presents results from a logit regression with stock market partici-
pation as the dependent variable. Stock market participation is equal to one, if an investor
holds any single stocks in a given year, and zero otherwise. Results in column (1) report
marginal effects evaluated at the mean investor. z -stats based on standard errors clustered
by county are presented in parentheses. Results in column (2) are from a logit regression,
where the dependent variable is stock market participation conditional on having a portfo-
lio. Column (3) shows results from a pooled OLS regression, where the dependent variable
is the fraction of stocks in an investor’s portfolio conditional on stock market participation.
t-stats based on standard errors clustered by county are presented in parentheses in column
(3). The main independent variable, East, is equal to one if an investor lives in East Ger-
many, and zero if an investor lives in West Germany. All variables are described in detail
in Appendix A. Regressions are based on the bank data set and are purely cross-sectional
using data from 2017.
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Table 4: cont’d
Stock market Participation Fraction stocks
participation if portfolio in portfolio
(1) (2) (3)
East -0.035*** -0.181*** -0.154***
(-4.92) (-3.97) (-4.80)
Gender (1=male) 0.054*** 0.155*** 0.154***
(8.85) (4.35) (6.10)
Investor age 0.005*** 0.020*** 0.010**
(3.36) (3.70) (2.59)
Investor age squared -0.000** -0.000*** -0.000***
(-2.54) (-4.51) (-2.44)
Married (1=yes) -0.001 -0.020 -0.010
(-0.15) (-0.61) (-0.39)
Employed (1=yes) 0.010* -0.021 -0.030
(1.68) (-0.62) (-1.15)
Trainee (1=yes) -0.033*** -0.035 -0.090*
(-3.07) (-0.71) (-1.75)
Retiree (1=yes) -0.016 0.072*** -0.039
(-1.26) (-0.96) (-0.70)
Online banking (1=yes) 0.090*** 0.223 0.211***
(12.96) (0.043) (6.54)
Mortgage (1=yes) -0.022** -0.129** -0.111**
(-2.35) (-2.23) (-2.49)
Relationship with bank -0.000 -0.005*** -0.005***
(-1.63) (-2.86) (-4.50)
Credit score -1.849*** -2.10 -0.884
(-3.45) (-2.01) (-1.59)
Ln(Income) -0.010*** -0.000 -0.011***
(-9.51) (0.919) (-3.05)
Ln(Savings) 0.019*** 0.005 -0.001
(15.09) (0.76) (-0.25)
Ln(Portfolio value) 0.047*** 0.013***
(8.51) (3.54)
Pseudo/Adj. R2 0.157 0.143 0.148
Observations 6,903 1,445 1,340
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Table 5: Investors who moved from East to West Germany
This table presents results from logit regressions with stock market participation as the
dependent variable. Stock market participation is equal to one, if an investor holds single
stocks in her portfolio in a given year, and zero otherwise. In all columns, marginal effects
evaluated at the mean investor are reported. z -stats based on standard errors clustered by
county are presented in parentheses. The main independent variable, East, is equal to one
if an investor lives in East Germany, and zero if an investor lives in West Germany. Mover
is a dummy variable equal to one if an investor has moved from East to West Germany.
Moved 10 years ago (Moved 20 years ago) is a dummy variable equal to one if an investor
has moved from East to West Germany at least 10 (20) years ago, and zero otherwise. We
include the same set of control variables as in Table 4. All variables are described in detail
in Appendix A. Regressions are based on the bank data set and survey results obtained
from the same bank.
All Only West Germans
observations
(1) (2) (3) (4)
East -0.080***
(-3.27)
Mover -0.046* -0.072**
(-1.94) (-2.14)
Moved 10 years ago -0.071*
(-1.76)
Moved 20 years ago -0.106***
(-3.01)
Control variables yes yes yes yes
Pseudo R2 0.354 0.333 0.329 0.327
Observations 241 198 187 175
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Table 6: Alternative explanations
Panel A of this table presents results from logit regressions with stock market participation
as the dependent variable. Stock market participation is equal to one, if an investor holds
stocks and/or equity funds in her portfolio in a given year, and zero otherwise. We report
marginal effects evaluated at the mean investor. z -stats based on standard errors clustered
by county are presented in parentheses. Results in Panel (B) (in Panel (C)) are from pooled
OLS regressions, where the dependent variable is the fraction of stocks (bonds) in an in-
vestor’s portfolio conditional on stock market participation. t-stats based on standard errors
clustered by county are presented in parentheses. The main independent variable, East, is
equal to one if an investor lives in East Germany, and zero if an investor lives in West Ger-
many. Regressions include the same set of control variables as in Table 2. In column (1), we
additionally control for investors’ risk tolerance measured on a scale from 1 (conservative)
to 3 (speculative). In column (2), we add investors’ income ranging from 1 (below 1,000
Euro per month) to 4 (above 3,000 Euro per month). In column (3), we include a survey
based measure for investors’ trust in the stock market ranging from 1 (low) to 7 (high).
In column (4), investors’ familiarity with the stock market is added ranging from 1 (high)
to 7 (low). Column (5) additionally includes investors’ financial literacy ranging from 0
(low) to 3 (high). Risk and income are measured at the investor level, trust, familiarity,
and financial literacy are measured at the county level. All variables are described in detail
in Appendix A. Regressions are based on the brokerage data set. The sample is from June
2004 to December 2012.
Panel A: Stock market participation
Risk Income Trust Familiarity Financial All
tolerance literacy variables
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
East –0.227∗∗∗ –0.264∗∗∗ –0.293∗∗∗ –0.270∗∗∗ –0.259∗∗∗ –0.174∗∗∗
(–9.21) (–9.64) (–9.90) (–9.29) (–9.12) (–5.50)
Risk tolerance 0.408∗∗∗ 0.407∗∗∗
(1=low, 3=high) (40.64) (37.09)
Income 0.084∗∗∗ 0.063∗∗∗
(1=low, 4=high) (19.46) (11.96)
Trust 0.015∗∗ 0.090∗∗∗
(1=low, 7=high) (2.12) (3.55)
Familiarity –0.008 0.062∗∗∗
(1=high, 7=low) (–1.54) (4.43)
Financial literacy 0.049∗∗∗ 0.171∗∗∗
(0=low, 3=high) (4.04) (5.13)
Control variables yes yes yes yes yes yes
Year FE yes yes yes yes yes yes
Pseudo R2 0.20 0.10 0.21 0.20 0.21 0.22
Observations 176,270 170,824 684,441 699,126 698,373 117,288
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Table 6: cont’d
Panel B: Fraction of stocks in portfolio
Risk Income Trust Familiarity Financial All
tolerance literacy variables
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
East –0.145∗∗∗ –0.152∗∗∗ –0.093∗∗∗ –0.094∗∗∗ –0.091∗∗∗ –0.164∗∗∗
(–8.53) (–8.30) (–6.11) (–6.51) (–6.39) (–8.17)
Risk tolerance 0.164∗∗∗ 0.156∗∗∗
(1=low, 3=high) (23.02) (17.68)
Income 0.018∗∗∗ 0.009∗∗
(1=low, 4=high) (5.62) (2.36)
Trust –0.001 0.037∗∗∗
(1=low, 7=high) (–0.15) (3.17)
Familiarity 0.001 0.028∗∗∗
(1=high, 7=low) (0.21) (3.93)
Financial literacy 0.021∗∗∗ 0.022
(0=low, 3=high) (2.60) (0.90)
Control variables yes yes yes yes yes yes
Year FE yes yes yes yes yes yes
Adj. R2 0.34 0.32 0.09 0.09 0.09 0.35
Observations 95,317 93,145 565,122 577,823 577,148 61,196
Panel C: Fraction of bonds in portfolio
Risk Income Trust Familiarity Financial All
tolerance literacy variables
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
East 0.167∗∗∗ 0.206∗∗∗ 0.217∗∗∗ 0.205∗∗∗ 0.201∗∗∗ 0.178∗∗∗
(6.45) (7.70) (9.92) (9.92) (9.53) (6.22)
Risk tolerance –0.245∗∗∗ –0.234∗∗∗
(1=low, 3=high) (–23.93) (–30.24)
Income –0.056∗∗∗ –0.031∗∗∗
(1=low, 4=high) (–14.50) (–7.81)
Trust 0.008∗ –0.002
(1=low, 7=high) (1.87) (–0.16)
Familiarity –0.008∗∗ –0.064∗∗∗
(1=high, 7=low) (–2.09) (–7.24)
Financial literacy –0.034∗∗∗ –0.081∗∗∗
(0=low, 3=high) (–3.00) (–3.14)
Control variables yes yes yes yes yes yes
Year FE yes yes yes yes yes yes
Adj. R2 0.27 0.20 0.24 0.24 0.24 0.28
Observations 176,026 172,256 684,099 698,774 698,021 117,099
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Table 7: Exposure to propaganda: Intensity
Panel A of this table presents results from logit regressions with stock market participation
as the dependent variable. Stock market participation is equal to one, if an investor holds
stocks and/or equity funds in her portfolio in a given year, and zero otherwise. We report
marginal effects evaluated at the mean investor. z -stats based on standard errors clustered
by county are presented in parentheses. Results in Panels (B) and (C) are from pooled OLS
regressions, where the dependent variable is the fraction of stocks in an investor’s portfolio
conditional on stock market participation (Panel B), or the fraction of bonds in an investors’
portfolio (Panel C). t-stats based on standard errors clustered by county are presented in
parentheses. The main independent variable, East, is equal to one if an investor lives in East
Germany, and zero if an investor lives in West Germany. Regressions include the same set of
control variables as in Table 2. In column (1), we interact the East German dummy variable
with a dummy variable which is equal to one if investors are 50 years of age or older, and
zero otherwise. In column (2), we interact the East German dummy variable with a dummy
variable equal to one if the shortest distance between a respective East German county
and the former border to West-Germany is above 100 kilometers, and zero if a counties is
located in an area within a 100 kilometers radius. The latter would belong to the “Border
Circle (Kleiner Grenzverkehr)” area. Regressions are based on the brokerage data set. The
sample is from June 2004 to December 2012.
Panel A: Stock market participation Age Distance All
interaction interaction variables
(1) (2) (3)
East –0.103∗∗∗ –0.142∗∗∗ –0.064∗∗∗
(–6.66) (–5.39) (–3.07)
East × above 50 –0.089∗∗∗ –0.085∗∗∗
(–9.45) (–9.05)
East × distance –0.058∗∗ –0.055∗∗
(–2.23) (–2.20)
Above 50 0.036∗∗∗ 0.034∗∗∗
(7.38) (7.23)
Control variables yes yes yes
Year FE yes yes yes
Pseudo R2 0.19 0.19 0.20
Observations 839,680 837,121 837,121
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Table 7: cont’d
Panel B: Fraction of stocks in portfolio Age Distance All
interaction interaction variables
(1) (2) (3)
East –0.021∗∗ –0.050∗∗∗ 0.001
(–2.39) (–3.83) (0.07)
East × above 50 –0.069∗∗∗ –0.068∗∗∗
(–6.46) (–6.49)
East × distance –0.036∗∗ –0.031∗∗
(–2.23) (–2.06)
Above 50 0.032∗∗∗ 0.031∗∗∗
(6.55) (6.49)
Control variables yes yes yes
Adj.R2 0.093 0.092 0.093
Observations 687,464 685,630 685,630
Panel C: Fraction of bonds in portfolio Age Distance All
interaction interaction variables
(1) (2) (3)
East 0.086∗∗∗ 0.112∗∗∗ 0.044
(7.92) (5.83) (1.41)
East × above 50 0.094∗∗∗ 0.090∗∗∗
(8.03) (4.37)
East × distance 0.078∗∗∗ 0.073
(2.78) (1.21)
Above 50 –0.024∗∗∗ –0.023∗∗∗
(–5.58) (–2.98)
Control variables yes yes yes
Year FE yes yes yes
Adj.R2 0.251 0.253 0.255
Observations 839,272 836,714 836,714
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Table 8: Exposure to communist ideology: Direction
This table presents results from tobit regressions where the dependent variable is the fraction
of (anti-)capitalist (columns (1) and (2)) or pro-communist (columns (3) and (4)) stocks
in an investor’s portfolio. In column (1), the dependent variable is the fraction of financial
companies in an investor’s portfolio. In column (2), the dependent variable is the fraction of
US companies in an investor’s portfolio. In column (3), the dependent variable is the fraction
of Chinese, Russian, or Vietnamese companies in an investor’s portfolio. In column (4), the
dependent variable is the fraction of (formerly) state-owned companies in an investor’s
portfolio. We include the same control variables as in Table 2. All variables are described
in detail in Appendix A. Robust t-stats are presented in parentheses. Standard errors are
clustered by county level. Regressions are based on the brokerage data set. The sample is
from June 2004 to December 2012.
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Table 8: cont’d
Companies of US Chinese, Russian, State
financial companies or Vietnamese owned
industry companies companies
(1) (2) (3) (4)
East –0.076∗∗∗ –0.048∗∗∗ 0.104∗∗∗ 0.041∗∗∗
(–4.74) (–2.71) (4.21) (3.11)
Gender (1=male) 0.083∗∗∗ 0.125∗∗∗ 0.143∗∗∗ –0.047∗∗∗
(14.47) (18.56) (9.40) (–14.37)
Investor age –0.279∗∗∗ –0.265∗∗∗ –0.190∗∗∗ 0.066∗∗∗
(–22.49) (–15.93) (–6.52) (8.08)
Married (1=yes) 0.024∗∗∗ –0.002 –0.003 –0.001
(4.11) (–0.31) (–0.21) (–0.34)
Portfolio value 0.119∗∗∗ 0.066∗∗∗ 0.137∗∗∗ 0.002∗∗
(59.71) (27.16) (35.63) (1.96)
Ln(Number of local banks) 0.002 0.015 –0.008 –0.022∗∗∗
(0.16) (1.40) (–0.46) (–3.27)
Ln(Total population) 0.004 –0.006 0.007 –0.006∗∗
(0.99) (–1.21) (1.00) (–2.30)
Time account is open –0.034∗∗∗ 0.097∗∗∗ 0.060∗∗∗ –0.040∗∗∗
(–7.49) (14.27) (4.56) (–13.28)
Ln(Real estate wealth per county) –0.003 –0.005∗∗∗ –0.005∗ 0.003∗
(–1.10) (–2.69) (–1.65) (1.84)
% High school degree in county 0.198∗∗ 0.028 –0.371∗∗ 0.034
(2.16) (0.27) (–2.08) (0.46)
Ln(GDP per capita) 0.004 0.067∗∗∗ 0.095∗∗∗ –0.040∗∗
(0.18) (3.06) (2.82) (–2.51)
Ln(Number of local firms) 0.023∗∗∗ 0.012∗ 0.002 –0.001
(4.15) (1.85) (0.18) (–0.39)
Year FE yes yes yes yes
Pseudo R2 0.096 0.036 0.088 0.019
Observations 622,777 622,777 622,777 551,624
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Table 9: Positive emotional tagging of communist experience: Renamed cities
and Olympics
Columns (1) to (3) of this table report marginal effects from logit regressions where the
dependent variable is equal to one, if an investor holds stocks and/or equity funds in her
portfolio in a given year, and zero otherwise. Columns (4) to (9) report results from pooled
OLS regressions. In columns (4) to (6), the dependent variable is the fraction of stocks
in an investor’s portfolio conditional on stock market participation. In columns (7) to (9),
the dependent variable is the fraction of bonds in an investor’s portfolio. We include the
same control variables as in Table 2. All variables are described in detail in Appendix A. In
columns (1) to (3) ((4) to (9)), z -stats (t-stats) based on standard errors clustered by county
are presented in parentheses. In columns (1), (4), and (7), we interact the East German
dummy variable with an indicator which is equal to one if an investor lives in a city that
was renamed during the GDR regime. Renamed cities include Chemnitz (Karl-Marx-Stadt),
Kriegsdorf (Friedensdorf), Neuhardenberg (Marxwalde), Werminghoff (Knappenrode), and
Eisenhu¨ttenstadt (Stalinstadt). In columns (2), (5), and (8), we interact the East German
dummy variable with an indicator which is equal to one if there was at least one Olympic
medal winner in the same zip-code area than a given investor, and zero otherwise. In columns
(3), (6), and (9), we interact the East German dummy variable with an indicator which is
equal to one if here was at least one Olympic gold medal winner in the same zip-code area
than the investor, and zero otherwise. Regressions are based on the brokerage data set. The
sample is from June 2004 to December 2012.
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Table 9: cont’d
Stock market part. Fraction of stocks Fraction of bonds
Re- Any Olympic Re- Any Olympic Re- Any Olympic
named Olympic gold named Olympic gold named Olympic gold
city medal medal city medal medal city medal medal
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
East –0.186∗∗∗ –0.189∗∗∗ –0.185∗∗∗ –0.0690∗∗∗ –0.066∗∗∗ –0.067∗∗∗ 0.152∗∗∗ 0.148∗∗∗ 0.147∗∗∗
(–10.57) (–4.67) (–4.59) (–7.66) (–3.77) (–3.76) (9.90) (3.67) (3.64)
East × Renamed city –0.181∗∗∗ –0.112∗∗ 0.192∗∗∗
(–2.90) (–2.41) (3.46)
East × Any Olympic medal –0.014 –0.023∗ 0.048∗
(–0.74) (–1.69) (1.79)
East × Olympic gold medal –0.034 –0.027∗ 0.070∗∗
(–1.32) (–1.86) (2.28)
Control variables yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Year FE yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Pseudo/Adj. R2 0.19 0.19 0.19 0.092 0.092 0.092 0.252 0.250 0.250
Observations 839,680 839,680 839,680 687,464 687,464 687,464 839,272 839,272 839,272
82
Table 10: Negative emotional tagging of communist experience: Access to West
TV
Column (1) of this table presents results from a logit regression with stock market partici-
pation as the dependent variable. Stock market participation is equal to one, if an investor
holds stocks and/or equity funds in her portfolio in a given year, and zero otherwise. Re-
sults in column (1) report marginal effects evaluated at the mean investor. z -stats based
on standard errors clustered by county are presented in parentheses. Results in columns
(2) and (3) are from pooled OLS regressions, where the dependent variable is the fraction
of stocks in an investor’s portfolio conditional on stock market participation (column (2),
or the fraction of bonds in an investors’ portfolio (column (3)). t-stats based on standard
errors clustered by county are presented in parentheses in columns (2) and (3). The main
independent variable, East, is equal to one if an investor lives in East Germany, and zero if
an investor lives in West Germany. All variables are described in detail in Appendix A. In
Panel A, we interact the main East German dummy variable with a dummy variable equal
to one for counties in the former GDR that did not receive TV signals from West Germany,
and zero otherwise. In Panel B, we only include a dummy variable reflecting counties in the
former GDR without access to West TV, and restrict the sample to all individuals living
in the same three-digit zip-code area than those without access to West TV. Counties with
no access to West TV are defined in Appendix A. Regressions are based on the brokerage
data set. We include the same set of control variables as in Table 2. The sample is from
June 2004 to December 2012.
83
Table 10: cont’d
Panel A: Full sample Stock Fraction of stocks Fraction of bonds
market in in
participation portfolio portfolio
(1) (2) (3)
East –0.198∗∗∗ –0.070∗∗∗ 0.163∗∗∗
(–10.19) (–7.31) (9.67)
East × No West TV 0.066∗∗∗ 0.013 –0.088∗∗∗
(4.67) (0.08) (–3.42)
Control variables yes yes yes
Year FE yes yes yes
Pseudo/Adj. R2 0.19 0.09 0.25
Observations 839,680 687,464 839,272
Panel B: Within East Germany Stock Fraction of stocks Fraction of bonds
market in in
participation portfolio portfolio
(1) (2) (3)
No West TV 0.170∗∗∗ –0.031 –0.156∗∗∗
(4.08) (–0.89) (–4.90)
Control variables yes yes yes
Year FE yes yes yes
Pseudo/Adj. R2 0.21 0.10 0.31
Observations 13,185 10,062 13,178
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Table 11: Negative emotional tagging of communist experience: Religiosity and
pollution
This table presents results from logit regressions where the dependent variable is equal
to one, if an investor holds stocks and/or equity funds in her portfolio in a given year,
and zero otherwise. Results in this table report marginal effects evaluated at the mean
investor. emphz-stats based on standard errors clustered by county are presented in
parentheses. The main independent variable, East, is equal to one if an investor lives in
East Germany, and zero if an investor lives in West Germany. Regressions include the same
set of control variables as in Table 2. In addition, we add variables reflecting religiosity
and the extent of environmental pollution, respectively, at a given investor’s county. In
column (1), we interact the East German dummy variable with an indicator equal to
one if an investor is from a county where the catholic church was particularly strong in
GDR times (i.e., Eichsfeld, thu¨ringische Rho¨n, and sorbische Oberlausitz). In column (2)
((3)), we interact the East German dummy variable with the fraction of members of the
catholic (protestant) church in a given investor’s county according to the 2011 census,
respectively. In column (4), we interact the East German dummy variable with the fraction
of catholics and protestants in a given investor’s county according to the 2011 census. In
column (5), we interact the East German dummy with an indicator reflecting the most
environmentally polluted counties in the GDR. According to a report from the German
ministry of environmental affairs published in 1990, there were 16 counties that needed
immediate action because of pollution. These areas are listed in Appendix B. Regres-
sions are based on the brokerage data set. The sample is from June 2004 to December 2012.
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Catholic Fraction Fraction Fraction Environm.
area catholics protestants catholics pollution
in GDR & prot.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
East –0.197∗∗∗ –0.214∗∗∗ –0.383∗∗∗ –0.398∗∗∗ –0.204∗∗∗
(–10.25) (–10.27) (–5.23) (–5.75) (–10.24)
East × catholic place GDR 0.065∗∗∗
(3.13)
East × Fraction Catholics 0.003∗∗∗
(3.12)
East × Fraction Protestants 0.006∗∗∗
(3.31)
East × Fraction Cath. & Prot. 0.005∗∗∗
(3.68)
East × Env. pollution 0.052∗∗
(2.51)
Control variables yes yes yes yes yes
Year FE yes yes yes yes yes
Pseudo R2 0.19 0.19 0.19 0.20 0.19
Observations 839,680 839,680 839,680 839,680 839,680
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Table 12: Consistency with attitudes towards communism
Columns (1) and (2) of this table present results from logit regressions with stock market
participation as the dependent variable. Stock market participation is equal to one, if an
investor holds stocks and/or equity funds in her portfolio in a given year, and zero other-
wise. We report marginal effects evaluated at the mean investor. z -stats based on standard
errors clustered by county are presented in parentheses. Results in columns (3) to (6) are
from pooled OLS regressions, where the dependent variable is the fraction of stocks in an
investor’s portfolio conditional on stock market participation, or the fraction of bonds in an
investors’ portfolio, respectively. t-stats based on standard errors clustered by county are
presented in parentheses. The main independent variable, East, is equal to one if an investor
lives in East Germany, and zero if an investor lives in West Germany. Regressions include
the same set of control variables as in Table 2. In columns (1), (3), and (5) we interact the
East German dummy variable with the fraction of voluntary secret police (STASI) spies
who lived in an investor’s county during the GDR regime. In columns (2), (4), and (6), we
interact the East German dummy variable with the fraction of survey respondents in an
investor’s county who state that the former political system of the GDR had many positive
aspects. Regressions are based on the brokerage data set. The sample is from June 2004 to
December 2012.
Stock market participation Fraction of stocks Fraction of bonds
STASI Liked STASI Liked STASI Liked
volun- GDR volun- GDR volun- GDR
teers pol. teers pol. teers pol.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
East –0.143∗∗∗ –0.116∗∗∗ –0.056∗∗∗ –0.029∗∗ 0.128∗∗∗ 0.060∗∗∗
(–6.05) (–6.37) (–4.65) (–2.45) (6.42) (3.12)
East × STASI –0.081∗∗ –0.044∗ 0.081∗
(–2.51) (–1.69) (1.66)
East × liked –0.219∗∗∗ –0.198∗∗∗ 0.426∗∗∗
GDR politics (–5.65) (–4.46) (5.72)
Control variables yes yes yes yes yes yes
Year FE yes yes yes yes yes yes
Pseudo R2 0.194 0.196 0.092 0.093 0.250 0.258
Observations 839,680 839,461 687,464 687,291 839,272 839,053
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Table 13: Trigger points: Election years
Column (1) of this table presents results from a logit regression with stock market partici-
pation as the dependent variable. Stock market participation is equal to one, if an investor
holds stocks and/or equity funds in her portfolio in a given year, and zero otherwise. Re-
sults in column (1) report marginal effects evaluated at the mean investor. z -stats based
on standard errors clustered by county are presented in parentheses. Results in columns
(2) and (3) are from pooled OLS regressions, where the dependent variable is the fraction
of stocks in an investor’s portfolio conditional on stock market participation (column (2),
or the fraction of bonds in an investors’ portfolio (column (3)). t-stats based on standard
errors clustered by county are presented in parentheses in columns (2) and (3). The main
independent variable, East, is equal to one if an investor lives in East Germany, and zero if
an investor lives in West Germany. All variables are described in detail in Appendix A. In
this table, we interact the East German dummy variable with a dummy variable which is
equal to one for federal election years in our sample, and zero otherwise. Federal elections
during our sample period took place in 2005 and 2009. Regressions are based on the bro-
kerage data set. We include the same set of control variables as in Table 2. The sample is
from June 2004 to December 2012.
Stock Fraction of stocks Fraction of bonds
market in in
participation portfolio portfolio
(1) (2) (3)
East –0.186∗∗∗ –0.073∗∗∗ 0.153∗∗∗
(–10.03) (–8.00) (9.47)
East × election years –0.019∗∗∗ 0.004 0.025∗∗∗
(–7.56) (0.92) (4.96)
Control variables yes yes yes
Pseudo/Adj. R2 0.19 0.09 0.25
Observations 839,680 687,464 839,272
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Table 14: Are anti-capitalist attitudes costly?
In Panels A and B of this table, we show results from a regression with the equal or value
weighted return, respectively, of a difference portfolio that is long in East German investors’
stock holdings and short in West German investors’ stock holdings as dependent variable.
To obtain performance alphas, in Panel A (B), difference returns are regressed on the
German (Global) CAPM market factor in columns (1) and (4), on the German (Global) 3
Fama and French (1993a) factors in columns (2) and (5) and on the the German (Global)
Carhart (1997b) 4-factor model in columns (3) and (6). German risk factors are computed
as described in Artmann, Finter, Kempf, Koch, and Theissen (2012), global risk factors are
obtained from Kenneth French’s website. In Panel C, column (1) shows marginal effects
from a logit regression where the dependent variable is equal to one if an investor holds
index funds and/or ETFs in her portfolio in a given year, and zero otherwise. Column (2)
shows results from an OLS regression where the dependent variable is the number of assets
in an investor’s portfolio in a given year. Column (3) shows results from an OLS regression
where the dependent variable is the average fund fees an investor pays for all equity funds
in her portfolio in a given year. Column (4) shows results from an OLS regression with
the Herfindahl index of an investor’s stock holdings in a given year as dependent variable.
In column (5), the dependent variable of the OLS regression is the fraction of bank-owned
products an investor holds in her portfolio. We regress the dependent variable on the East
German dummy variable and the same set of control variables as in Table 2. Robust t-stats
are presented in parentheses. Standard errors are clustered by county level. Regressions are
based on the brokerage data set. The sample is from June 2004 to December 2012.
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Table 14: cont’d
Panel A: German risk factors
Equal weighted Value weighted
CAPME−Wt 3-Factor
E−W
t 4-Factor
E−W
t CAPM
E−W
t 3-Factor
E−W
t 4-Factor
E−W
t
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Performance alphaEast−Westt -0.080** -0.070* -0.097** -0.109** -0.098** -0.089**
(-2.00) (-1.80) (-2.45) (-2.40) (-2.37) (-2.08)
MKTRFGerman -0.024*** -0.031*** -0.023*** 0.014* 0.007 0.004
(-4.04) (-4.45) (-3.03) (1.81) (0.91) (0.48)
SMBGerman -0.034** -0.026* -0.037*** -0.040***
(-2.46) (-1.85) (-2.64) (-2.65)
HMLGerman -0.016 -0.013 -0.016 -0.017
(-1.24) (-0.99) (-0.84) (-0.86)
WMLGerman 0.023*** -0.007
(3.24) (-0.65)
Adj. R2 0.110 0.163 0.193 0.023 0.072 0.065
Observations 92 92 92 92 92 92
Panel B: Global risk factors
Equal weighted Value weighted
CAPME−Wt 3-Factor
E−W
t 4-Factor
E−W
t CAPM
E−W
t 3-Factor
E−W
t 4-Factor
E−W
t
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Performance alphaEast−Westt -0.080** -0.073** -0.076** -0.109** -0.107** -0.101**
(-2.04) (-2.00) (-2.08) (-2.36) (-2.32) (-2.18)
MKTRFGlobal -0.030*** -0.023*** -0.022*** 0.018* 0.020* 0.017
(-4.59) (-4.03) (-3.77) (1.79) (1.98) (1.57)
SMBGlobal -0.086*** -0.087*** -0.033 -0.031
(-3.41) (-3.49) (-1.19) (-1.10)
HMLGlobal -0.026 -0.022 -0.004 -0.011
(-1.34) (-1.08) (-0.10) (-0.31)
WMLGlobal 0.008 -0.014
(0.91) (-1.04)
Adj. R2 0.133 0.216 0.212 0.032 0.023 0.025
Observations 92 92 92 92 92 92
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Panel B: Other costs Passive # of Fund Herfindahl Bank owned
investments assets fees index products
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
East –0.010∗∗∗ –1.509∗∗∗ 0.051∗∗∗ 0.038∗∗∗ 0.031∗
(–5.25) (–4.74) (4.71) (2.72) (1.73)
Gender (1=male) 0.009∗∗∗ 1.023∗∗∗ –0.002 –0.036∗∗∗ –0.060∗∗∗
(14.08) (15.61) (–0.38) (–14.28) (–12.93)
Investor age –0.029∗∗∗ –0.196 0.059∗∗∗ 0.043∗∗∗ 0.045∗∗∗
(–23.05) (–1.01) (4.13) (4.77) (4.35)
Married (1=yes) 0.004∗∗∗ 0.314∗∗∗ –0.002 –0.003 –0.025∗∗∗
(6.21) (5.41) (–0.28) (–1.33) (–5.65)
Ln(Portfolio value) 0.007∗∗∗ 1.137∗∗∗ –0.011∗∗∗ –0.075∗∗∗ –0.090∗∗∗
(25.50) (31.79) (–6.44) (–80.25) (–72.80)
Ln(Number of local banks) 0.003∗∗ 0.239 –0.017∗∗ –0.003 0.010
(2.18) (1.44) (–2.42) (–0.50) (1.10)
Ln(Total population) –0.000 0.059 0.000 –0.002 0.003
(–0.27) (1.06) (0.15) (–1.09) (0.98)
Time account is open 0.005∗∗∗ 1.798∗∗∗ –0.000 –0.050∗∗∗ –0.122∗∗∗
(6.24) (17.41) (–0.03) (–13.20) (–16.91)
Ln(Real estate wealth) –0.001∗∗∗ –0.073∗∗∗ 0.003∗ 0.002∗ –0.002
(–3.72) (–3.13) (1.89) (1.69) (–1.36)
High school degree 0.040∗∗∗ 2.149 –0.207∗∗ –0.019 –0.087
(2.82) (1.16) (–2.54) (–0.31) (–0.86)
Ln(GDP per capita) 0.008∗∗∗ 0.524∗∗ –0.011 –0.010 –0.012
(2.85) (2.22) (–0.68) (–0.90) (–0.53)
Ln(Number of local firms) 0.002∗∗∗ 0.157∗ –0.012∗∗∗ –0.005 0.002
(3.02) (1.85) (–2.66) (–1.53) (0.43)
Year FE yes yes yes yes yes
Pseudo/Adj. R2 0.11 0.20 0.08 0.34 0.36
Observations 515,856 839,680 60,690 622,777 90,215
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Appendix A: Brief definitions and sources of main variables
This table briefly defines the main variables used in the empirical analysis. The
data sources are:
(i) BRO: Brokerage data , 299,923 retail investors, personal characteristics as of December
2012 and monthly holdings from June 2004 to December 2012,
(ii) BAC: Bank account data: 6,903 clients, personal characteristics as of August 2017,
account balances are monthly averages over the time period from January 2016 to
August 2017,
(iii) BS: Bank survey, 2,133 respondents, conducted in the first quarter of 2017,
(iv) GFSO: German Federal Statistic Office,
(v) ECB: European Central Bank,
(vi) MC: Manually collected,
(vii) Wiki: Wikipedia,
(viii) KAF: Konrad Adenauer Foundation, http://www.kas.de/wf/de/71.6604/,
(ix) GMEA: German Ministry of Environmental Affairs,
(x) MS: Morningstar,
(xi) CFR: Center for Financial Research, Cologne,
(xii) KFL: Kenneth French’s data library,
(xiii) DB: Deutsche Bundesbank,
(xiv) SAVE: SAVE Household Panel conducted by the Munich Center for the Economics
of Aging, a department of the Max Planck Institute for Social Law and Social Policy,
wave of 2009 with 2,222 respondents across Germany,
(xv) ID: Infratest dimap, 1,022 respondents across East German, survey conducted by the
polling institute in 2014
(xvi) BC: Bursztyn and Cantoni (2016),
(xvii) DS: Datastream.
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Variable name Description Source
Above 50 An indicator variable equal to one if an investor is 50 years of age
or above, and zero otherwise.
BRO,
BAC
Any Olympic medal Indicator variable equal to one if there was at least one Olympic
medal winner in the same zip-code area than a given investor, and
zero otherwise
MC,
Wiki
Catholic Place GDR An indicator variable equal to one if an investor is from a county
where the catholic church was particularly strong in GDR times
(i.e., Eichsfeld, Thueringische Rhoen, and sorbische Oberlausitz).
KAF
Chinese, Russian, or
Vietnamese firms
Fraction of Chinese, Russian, or Vietnamese companies (stocks)
in an investor’s portfolio identified via the datastream geography
code, specifying the home or listing country of a company security.
BRO,
DS
Credit score A client’s default probability as calculated by the bank’s internal
scoring system.
BAC
Distance A dummy variable equal to one if the shortest distance between
a respective East German county and the former border to West-
Germany exceeds 100 kilometers, and zero otherwise.
MC
East An indicator variable that equals one if an individual lives in
East Germany (i.e., Brandenburg, Mecklenburg-Western Pomera-
nia, Saxony, Saxony-Anhalt, Thuringia), and zero otherwise.
GFSO
East Berlin An indicator variable that equals one if an investor lives in East
Berlin, which belonged to the GDR before Reunification (i.e.,
Friedrichshain, Lichtenberg, Marzahn-Hellersdorf, Mitte, Pankow,
Treptow-Ko¨penick), and zero if an individual lives in West Berlin.
MC
Election years An indicator variable equal to one for federal election years in our
sample, and zero otherwise. Federal elections during our sample
period took place in 2005 and 2009.
MC
Employed An indicator variable that equals one if a client is employed, and
zero otherwise.
BAC
Environmental pollu-
tion
An indicator equal to one for the most environmentally polluted
areas in the GDR, and zero otherwise. According to a press release
of the Ministry of Environmental Affairs of the FRG on June 26th
1990, these 16 areas are: Bad Blankenburg, Bad Du¨rrenberg, Bitter-
feld, Buna, Dessau, Dresden, Dresden-Kaditz, Erfurt-Ku¨hnhausen,
Freiberg, Leuna, Magdeburg, Ro¨blingen, Schmilka, Thierbach, Wit-
tenberg/Piesteritz, Zehren.
GMEA
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Variable name Description Source
Familiarity County level average of responses to bank survey question on how
much individuals agree with the following statement: “The stock
market is a closed book to me.” Answers are given on a 7 point
Likert scale (7=I fully agree).
BS
Financial literacy County level average of basic financial literacy score following van
Rooij, Lusardi, and Alessie (2011). It is based on three quiz-like ques-
tions covering the understanding of inflation, interest rates as well as
risk diversification. The score counts the number of correct answer
ranging from 0 (low literacy) to 3 (high literacy).
BS
Firms of Financial
Industry
Fraction of financial companies in an investor’s portfolio. Single stock
holdings were classified using the ICBIC industry code 8000 for fi-
nancials.
BRO,
DS
Fraction of bank
owned products
Fraction of bank-owned products (funds) an investor holds in her
portfolio.
BRO,
MS
Fraction of bonds Fraction of bonds in an investor’s portfolio. BRO
Fraction of Cath. &
Prot.
Fraction of Catholics and Protestants in an investor’s county accord-
ing to the 2011 census.
GFSO
Fraction of Catholics Fraction of members of the catholic church in an investor’s county
according to the 2011 census.
GFSO
Fraction of Protes-
tants
Fraction of members of the protestant church in an investor’s county
according to the 2011 census.
GFSO
Fraction of stocks if
participating
Fraction of stocks in an investor’s portfolio conditional on partici-
pating in the stock market.
BRO,
BAC
Fund fees Average fund fees (total expense ratios) an investor pays for all equity
funds in her portfolio in a given year in percent.
BRO,
MS
GDP per Capita GDP per Capita on the county level. GFSO
Gender An indicator variable that equals one if a client is male, and zero if
she is female.
BRO,
BAC
High school degree Share of inhabitants in a county with a high school degree according
to the 2011 census.
GFSO
HMLGerman The monthly Fama French value factor for the German stock market. CFR
HMLGlobal The monthly Fama French value factor for the global stock market. KFL
Income (1=low,
4=high)
Self-reported income of broker client ranging from 1 (low) to 4 (high). BRO
Income (in Euro) A clients income as proxied by the bank based on regular monthly
inflows to the current account.
BAC
Investor age Age of a client in years. BRO,
BAC
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Variable name Description Source
Liked GDR politics Fraction of survey respondents in an investor’s county who agree that
the former political system of the GDR had particular strengths. The
exact question is: “If you compare today’s social and political condi-
tions to those in the former GDR - Do you think the the GDR had
special strength with regard to the political system?”. Respondents
could either agree, not agree, or chose the “don’t know” option.
ID
Married An indicator variable that equals one if the client is married, and
zero otherwise.
BRO,
BAC
MKTRFGerman The monthly market factor (value-weighted CDAX performance) less
the risk-free rate (one-month money-market rate) for the German
capital market.
CFR
MKTRFGlobal The monthly market factor (all CRSP firms incorporated in the US
and listed on the NYSE, AMEX, or NASDAQ that have a CRSP
share code of 10 or 11) less the risk-free rate (minus the one-month
Treasury bill rate) for the global capital market.
KFL
Mortgage An indicator variable that equals one if the client holds a mortgage
with the bank.
BAC
Mover An indicator variable that equals one if the client has moved from
East to West Germany after the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989.
Clients have been asked whether and when they have lived in East
Germany during their lifetime.
BS
Moved 10 years ago An indicator variable equal to one if an investor has moved from East
to West Germany at least 10 years ago, and zero otherwise.
BS
Moved 20 years ago An indicator variable equal to one if an investor has moved from East
to West Germany at least 20 years ago, and zero otherwise.
BS
No West TV An indicator variable equal to one for counties in the former GDR
that did not receive TV signals from West Germany, and zero oth-
erwise. Counties with no access to West TV comprise: Dresden
Stadt, Altentreptow, Niesky, Anklam, Ribnitz-Damgarten, Malchin,
Bautzen, Neubrandenburg Stadt, Ueckermuende, Teterow, Lobau,
Pirna, Greifswald Land, Demmin, Goerlitz Land, Grimmen, Wolgast,
Greifswald Stadt, Zittau, Goerlitz Stadt, Stralsund Land, Stralsund
Stadt, Ruegen.
BC
Number of assets in
portfolio
The number of assets in an investor’s portfolio in a given year. BRO
Number of local
banks
Number of local bank branches in a given county and year. DB
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Variable name Description Source
Number of local firms Number of registered firms in a given county and year. GFSO
Olympic gold medal An indicator variable equal to one if there was at least one Olympic
Gold medal winner in the same zip-code area than an investor, and
zero otherwise.
MC, Wiki
Online banking An indicator variable that equals one if the client has access to online
banking, and zero otherwise.
BAC
Passive investments An indicator equal to one if an investor hold index funds or ETFs in
her portfolio in a given year, and zero otherwise.
Broker,
MS
Portfolio concentra-
tion
Herfindahl index of an investor’s stock holdings in a given year. BRO
Portfolio value The total value of a client’s portfolio in the end of a given year (in
Euro).
BRO,
BAC
Real estate An indicator variable that equals one if the client owns a house, and
zero otherwise.
BS
Real estate wealth The average self-reported wealth in real estate elicited by the
SAVE household survey. Responses are aggreagted (mean values)
per county.
SAVE
Relationship with
bank
Number of years, the client has a business relation with the bank. BAC
Renamed city An indicator variable equal to one if an investor lives in a city that
was renamed during the GDR regime. Renamed cities include Chem-
nitz (Karl-Marx-Stadt), Kriegsdorf (Friedensdorf), Neuhardenberg
(Marxwalde), Werminghof (Knappenrode), and Eisenhuettenstadt
(Stalinstadt).
Wiki
Retiree An indicator variable that equals one if the client is retired, and zero
otherwise.
BAC
Risk attitude A client’s answer to the question how much she agrees with the fol-
lowing statement “I do not mind taking risk regarding investments”
on a 1 to 7 scale (7=“I fully agree”).
BS
Risk tolerance A client’s self-reported individual risk tolerance on a scale ranging
from 1 (low) to 3 (high) assessed when her brokerage account is
opened.
BRO
Savings (in Euro) A client’s average positive balance on a savings account. BAC
SMBGerman The monthly Fama-French size factor for the German stock market. CFR
SMBGlobal The monthly Fama-French size factor for the global stock market. KFL
STASI Fraction of voluntary secret police (STASI) collaborators who lived
in an investor’s county during the GDR regime.
ECB
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Variable name Description Source
State owned compa-
nies
A dummy variable indicating the largest formerly state-owned
companies in Germany: Deutsche Telekom, Deutsche Lufthansa,
Deutsche Post, Deutsche Postbank, and Fraport.
MC
Stock market partici-
pation
A dummy variable equal to one if an investor holds either stocks or
equity funds in her portfolio, and zero otherwise.
BRO
Time account is open Number of months passed since a client’s account was opened with
the brokerage.
BRO
Total population The average number of inhabitants per zip-code area. GFSO
Trainee An indicator variable that equals one if the client is a trainee and
zero otherwise.
BAC
Trust The county level average answer to the statement: I have confidence
in securities markets. Measured on a 1-7 scale (7= I fully agree).
BS
US firms Fraction of US companies in an investor’s portfolio identified via the
datastream geography code, specifying the home or listing country
of a company security.
BRO, DS
WMLGerman The monthly momentum factor for the German stock market. CFR
WMLGlobal The monthly momentum factor for the global stock market. KFL
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Appendix B: Non-linear wealth controls
Columns (1) to (3) of this table present results from logit regressions with stock market
participation as the dependent variable. Stock market participation is equal to one, if an
investor holds any single stocks in a given year, and zero otherwise. Results in column (4)
are also from a logit regression, where the dependent variable is stock market participation
conditional on having a portfolio. We report marginal effects evaluated at the mean investor.
z -stats based on standard errors clustered by county are presented in parentheses. Column
(5) shows results from a pooled OLS regression, where the dependent variable is the fraction
of stocks in an investor’s portfolio conditional on stock market participation. t-stats based
on standard errors clustered by county are presented in parentheses in column (5). The
main independent variable, East, is equal to one if an investor lives in East Germany, and
zero if an investor lives in West Germany. We include the same set of control variables as in
Table 4. Additionally, we include income, savings, and portfolio values to the power of two
and three to capture a potential non-linear impact of wealth on stock market participation.
All variables are described in detail in Appendix A. Regressions are based on the bank data
set and are purely cross-sectional using data from 2017.
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Stock market Stock market Stock market Participation if Fraction stocks
participation participation participation portfolio in portfolio
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
East -0.035*** -0.033*** -0.031*** -0.175*** -0.142***
(-4.92) (-4.60) (-4.41) (-3.81) (-4.76)
Ln(Income) -0.010*** -0.026*** 0.007 -0.018 -0.059*
(-9.51) (-7.58) (0.54) (-0.42) (-1.87)
Ln(Income)2 0.002*** -0.005* 0.001 0.008
(5.15) (-1.79) (0.08) (1.23)
Ln(Income)3 0.000** 0.000 -0.000
(2.30) (0.25) (-0.97)
Ln(Savings) 0.019*** 0.021*** 0.053*** 0.255*** 0.090***
(15.09) (5.74) (4.40) (3.67) (2.88)
Ln(Savings)2 -0.000 -0.006*** -0.041*** -0.013**
(-0.88) (-2.92) (-3.40) (-2.30)
Ln(Savings)3 0.000*** 0.002*** 0.001*
(2.79) (3.08) (1.72)
Ln(Portfolio Value) 0.379*** 0.272***
(7.61) (9.00)
Ln(Portfolio Value)2 -0.060*** -0.041***
(-6.66) (-7.48)
Ln(Portfolio Value)3 0.003*** 0.002***
(6.48) (6.61)
Control variables yes yes yes yes yes
Pseudo /Adj. R2 0.157 0.164 0.171 0.186 0.210
Observations 6,903 6,903 6,903 1,445 1,340
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Appendix C: Correlations between proxies for exposure to communist ideology
This table shows correlations of all proxies used to examine intensity and emotional coloring of experiencing com-
munism. All variables are described in detail in Appendix A. p-values are provided in parentheses.
Variables Inv. Dis- Re- Any Olympic Cath- Poll- No STASI Liked Emp- GDP
age tance named Olympic gold olics ution West loyed per
city medal medal TV politics Capita
Investor age 1.000
Distance 0.104 1.000
(0.000)
Renamed city 0.069 0.205 1.000
(0.000) (0.000)
Any medal 0.036 0.129 0.328 1.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Gold medal 0.052 0.114 0.380 0.851 1.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Catholics -0.106 -0.006 -0.015 0.013 0.006 1.000
(0.000) (0.021) (0.000) (0.000) (0.015)
Pollution -0.064 -0.045 -0.064 -0.104 -0.127 -0.050 1.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
No West TV -0.089 0.093 -0.045 -0.052 -0.058 -0.010 0.393 1.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
STASI 0.187 0.214 0.051 0.152 0.152 -0.240 -0.243 -0.349 1.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Likes GDR pol. 0.097 0.338 0.104 -0.095 -0.067 -0.141 -0.091 -0.079 0.092 1.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Employed -0.041 0.058 0.095 0.141 0.131 0.043 -0.038 0.006 0.048 0.198 1.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.016) (0.000) (0.000)
GDP p. Capita -0.167 -0.109 0.034 -0.050 -0.057 -0.055 0.432 0.263 -0.169 -0.121 0.267 1.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
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Appendix D: Top 10 holdings of (anti-) capitalist stocks
Panel A of this Table contains the Top 10 holdings of stocks belonging to the financial
industry or stocks of US companies, respectively, in investors’ portfolios. Panel B of this
table contains the Top 10 holdings of Russian, and Chinese firms, as well as the top holding
of Vietnamese firms. We also add a description on the main business field of these companies
and whether they are state-owned or not.
Panel A: Financial industry and US stocks
Financial industry US stocks
DEUTSCHE BANK CISCO SYSTEMS
COMMERZBANK MICROSOFT
ALLIANZ GENERAL ELECTRIC
MUENCHENER RUCK. INTEL
DEUTSCHE POSTBANK EMC
WCM BETEILIGUNG UND GRUNDBESITZ PFIZER
MLP WORLDCOM (delisted)
COMDIRECT BANK YAHOO
HYPO REAL ESTATE HLDG. (delisted) COMMERCE ONE (delisted)
DEUTSCHE BOERSE DELL
Panel B: Stocks of formerly communist countries
Russia Description
OAO GAZPROM State owned, Industry: Energy, Oil
and Gas
LUKOIL OAO Industry: Energy, Oil and Gas
ROSNEFT State owned, Industry: Energy, Oil
and Gas
ROSTELECOM Industry: Communication Services,
Telecom Services
NORILSK NICKEL Industry: Basic Materials, Industrial
Metal & Minerals
Yukos Oil (delisted) Industry: Energy, Oil and Gas
GAZPROM NEFT Maj. Shareholder: Gazprom (state
owned), Industry: Energy, Oil and Gas
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Appendix D: cont’d
Panel B (cont’d): Stocks of formerly communist countries
Russia Description
MOSENERGO Maj. Shareholder: Gazprom (state owned), Industry: Utilities
- Independent Power Producers
TRADE HOUSE
GUM
Industry: Consumer Cyclical
SURGUTNEFTEGAZ Industry: Energy, Oil and Gas
China Description
PETROCHINA Industry: Energy, Oil and Gas
BYD Industry: Consumer Cyclical, Auto Manufacturers
CHINA LIFE INSUR-
ANCE
State owned, Industry: Financial Services, Insurance-Life
CHINA
PETROLEUM
CHEMCIAL
Maj. Shareholder: Sinopec (state owned), Industry: Energy,
Oil and Gas
ICBC Financial Services, Banks Global
CHINA TELECOM Maj. Shareholder: China Telecommunication Corp. (state
owned), Industry: Communication Services, Telecom Services
TSINGTAO BREW-
ERY
State as Min. SH, Sector/Industry: Consumer Defensive, Bev-
erages Brewers
CHINA CONSTRUC-
TION BANK
Maj. Shareholder:SH Central Huijin Investment (state-
owned), Industry: Financial Services, Banks Global
BANK OF CHINA Maj. Shareholder:SH Central Huijin Investment (state-
owned), Industry: Financial Services, Banks Global
CHINA COSCO
SHIPPING
State owned, Industry: Industrials, Shipping & Ports
Vietnam Description
Vietnam Holding Industry: Financials, Asset Management; Firm operates a
closed end fund investing in former state-owned enterprises
and private enterprises in Vietnam
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